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ABSTRACT 
For many years, in United States, Australia and New Zealand there has been 
legislation prohibiting anti-competitive conduct on the part of monopolies. 
Allied with this has been a recognition that what a firm might not be able to 
achieve on its own, it might be able to do by colluding with other firms in order 
to bring about an anti-competitive effect. The policy reasons against monopoly 
are equally applicable to such conduct. 
In reading the Commerce Act 1986 it seems obvious that s 36 deals with the 
problems arising from monopolistic activities and s 27 is concerned with those 
firms which enter into contracts arrangements or undertakings in order to 
become de facto monopolies. This is certainly the interpretation given to the 
similarly structured United States Sherman Act of 1890. 
The need for collusion has however been progressively weakened, to include 
schemes where parties are coerced into 'playing ball' and those where parties 
have knowledge of another's anti-competitive intent and participate 
nonetheless. In Port Nelson Limited v Commerce Commission, the ew Zealand 
Court of Appeal appears to have struck a death blow by saying that where one 
party has the requisite anti-competitive purpose, so long as that is a 
'substantial' purpose, whenever other parties, acting purely in their own self 
interest, contract with the first party there will be a breach of s 27, without any 
suggestion of collusion as to purpose. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography 
and annexures) comprises approximately 15,700 words. 
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SHIFTING GROUND WITHIN THE COMMERCE ACT: Is THE 
NEED FOR COLLUSION DEAD? 
I INTRODUCTION 
In the early years of the Commerce Act 1986, the main enquiry in applying s 271 
was in deciding what distinguished a "contract" from an "arrangement or 
understanding" without any real consideration of the nature of a "contract 
arrangement or understanding" necessary to constitute a breach. 
In particular, there was no enqmry into whether the parties to the alleged 
arrangement were completely ad idem as to all elements of that arrangement, 
including subjective elements such as their reasons for pursuing the arrangement. 
Essentially, and this may well have been the result of the Commerce Commission 
selective enforcement of the Act, the approach was that wherever there was some 
substantial lessening of competition resulting from two or more firms acting in 
concert, the Act was breached; the major issue in these cases being to establish 
that the firms were in some way acting pursuant to some arrangement or 
understanding, where no actual contract could be established. 
One feature was that they targeted horizontal arrangements, that is arrangement 
between firms which should have competed with each other which had the 
purpose or effect of stifling that competition. 
Given the wording of s 27, with its focus upon 'contract arrangement or 
understanding', it at first appears incongruous that it might be aid that only one 
party need have the purpose of substantially lessening competition to constitute a 
breach. Recently however, the courts have had to consider situations where the 
contracts are between firms in a non-integrated vertical market (such as a supplier 
1 "27. Contracts, arrangements, or understandings substantially lessening competition 
prohibited - {I) No person shall enter into a contract or arrangement, or arrive at an 
understanding containing a provision that has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the 
effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market". 
LA.,._ 1.lBH .., 
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and its customers). The purpo e or effect of the supplier in entering these 
contracts has been to preserve the supplier's ability to re trict competition, so 
there is a horizontal market impact, but the difficulty has been that the other 
contracting parties cannot be seen to share the supplier's purpose. 
Although there may be a "meeting of minds" in terms of reaching that particular 
contract, there may well not be (and perhaps will not generally be) a meeting of 
minds as to the purpose of the contract2• This issue has arisen both in New 
Zealand, in the High Court3 and the Court of Appea14 in the Port Nelson litigation, 
and in Australia, in the Federal Court in ASX Operations Pty Ltd v Pont Data 
Australia Pty Ltd5 • 
Does it matter? Surely if a firm has no dominance, in the sense of significant 
market power, any intention it may have in substantially lessening competition 
cannot, as a matter of elementary economics, be carried through into effect. 
Alternatively, if such a firm can impact a market in this way, can it not be seen as 
dominant in that market and thereby restrained in its conduct by s Jrl:? 
One might think so, but the courts7 appear to have emasculated s 36 by their 
interpretation of key elements within that section, in particular "dominant" and 
"use" where it refers to use of a dominant position for proscribed purpose . 
2 Given that a customer will not generally know that a particular price has been adopted to 
undercut potential or actual rivals and can be expected to act in its best intere ts and take 
the "best deal" in terms of price and service, it would be artificial to regard the customer 
as in any way sharing or adopting the supplier's motives or purpo es. A customer who 
deliberately accepted a lesser deal (lesser because it was for lower services or a higher 
price) would be regarded as irrational. 
3 Commerce Commission v Port Nelson Ltd ( 1995) 5 NZBLC I 03,762 
4 Port Nelson Ltd v Commerce Commission (Unrep, CA 169/95, 3/7/96) 
5 
( I 99 I) A TPR 41-069 
6 36. Use of a Dominant Position in a market - (I) No person who has a dominant 
position in a market shall use that position for the purpose of -
(a) Restricting the entry of any person into that or any other market; or 
(b) Preventing or deterring any person from engaging in competitive 
conduct in that or in any other market; or 
(c) Eliminating any person from that or any other market. 
7 Endorsed by the Privy Council decision in Telecom Corporation of NZ Ltd v Clear 
Communications Ltd [ I 995] I NZLR 385 
5 
This development appears to have gone largely unnoticed in New Zealand, 
although Hampton8 has criticised it on the grounds of being "conceptually 
unsound and fails to take account of the genesis of s 27" . This paper considers 
the development apparent in the Port Nelson litigation against the background of 
Hampton's views, paying particular attention to the following: 
1. The justifications used for having provisions likes 27 on the statute books; 
2. The development from the United States origin to New Zealand, via an 
intermediate period of incubation and amendment in Australia;9 
3. The current status of s 36; 
4. Whether the antipodean Courts have, albeit inadvertently, interpreted s 27 in 
such a way that it can be used to remedy perceived harmful effects of 
oligopolistic, particularly non-co-operative, behaviour. 
8 
Lindsay F Hampton Port Nelson Ltd v Commerce Commission: Has the Court of Appeal read 
the need for concerted action out of s 27 of the Commerce Act? Paper delivered to 7th 
Annual Workshop, Competition law and Policy Institute of New Zealand 1996 
9 
This is necessary because, for example, Hampton criticises the New Zealand courts for, in his 
view, departing from the interpretations of the United State Sherman Act 1890. 
6 
II JUSTIFICATION FOR LEGISLATIVE INVOLVEMENT 
As long ago as 1776, Adam Smith issued a warning to the public against the 
dangers of firms talking amongst themselves when he wrote: 
"People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment 
and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the 
public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.1" 
Smith's fear was that if these people of the same trade met together, there would 
be a natural tendency for them to act co-operatively for their own benefit, and act 
together in much the same way as a monopoly might, in respect of which he 
wrote: 
"The monopolists, by keeping the market constantly understocked by 
never fully supplying the effectual demand, sell their commodities much 
above the natural price, and raise their emoluments, whether they 
consist in wages or profit, greatly above their natural price" 
This is certainly consistent with the more recently expressed views of Areeda1110 
who, in discussing the emphasis of the American antitrust legislation on 
prevention of collusive conduct, gives as its rationale the fact that co-operation 
increases the risk of anti-competitive action, expands market power, creates an 
anti-competitive restraint not otherwise possible and surrenders important 
decision making autonomy on a matter of competitive significance. 
In this context, Pengilly1 1 m discussing the philosophic background of the 
Commerce Act 1986 notes: 
"History has long demonstrated that the absence of government 
regulation, without more, does not give rise to free enterprise. It gives 
10 Volume VI, para 1402(b) 
11 
Warren Pengilly New Zealand Commerce Legislation: The likely impact on commercial 
conduct in the light of Australian experience [ 1986] NZLJ I 11, 112 
7 
rise to a system which is free in the sense that the Government does 
not directly assume responsibility [to decide who makes what] ... But the 
responsibility for these decisions in the absence of an effective 
competition law is all too often not that of the individual decision maker 
but that of the private regulator operating through industry agreements, 
price cartel and the like. A truly private enterprise system demands that 
no individual or private group subvert the system itself. The decision of 
a private regulator is still that of a regulator. "12 
An economic justification in terms of competition eliminating the potential of 
'dead-weight' loss and thereby increasing efficiency is provided in Appendix One. 
Related to this is the concept of transfers of wealth away from consumers to 
suppliers, which some argue to be harmful although the classical economists view 
is that if there is no alteration to the amount of production, it is not relevant who 
takes the benefit. 
For many, these consequences are seen as sufficient to justify some restriction 
upon the powers of monopolies ( or firms which join together to act like 
monopolies) to influence supplies or price. 
For others, different considerations, such as a fear of political influence or a need 
to protect smaller independent firms are seen to justify some form of restriction. 13 
The critical factor to be taken from these stated objectives is that it is the conduct 
of monopolies or individual firms which band together to act like a monopoly 
which is seen to justify legislative action. 
12 
Emphasis added. This discussion is developed in W J Pengilly Private and Public Regulation 
under Competition Law: An Evaluation (1981) 9 ABLR 3 
13 
A useful summary of the different justifications for what is called "antitrust law" in the United 
States is provided by Robert H Lande Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary 
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged ( 1982) 34 Hastings U 
65. Again, it is not the purpose of this paper to resolve which factors justify legislative 
control nor which should have primacy but rather to demonstrate what it is these attempt 
to justify. 
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III THE ORIGINS OF SECTION 27 
A United States Approach 
1 The Sherman Act 
In 1890, the United States legislature prohibited "[e]very contract, combination in 
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce ... 14" 
In s 2 of the same Act, it also made the activity of "[e]very person who shall 
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other 
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the 
several States ... " unlawful. 
It is necessary to consider the United States' Courts' interpretations of the 
wording of the Sherman Act in some detail, because these ections can be seen as 
the fountainhead of the New Zealand legislation. 
Although one must be cautious m considering and applying United State' 
thinking to the New Zealand situation, there is judicial recognition that New 
Zealand is "following in the footsteps of a tradition", namely the Sherman Act 
and: 
"In the trade practices area, the 1986 Act clearly follows in a general 
way a number of approaches adopted in Australia under the Trade 
Practices Act 1974, which in turn in some areas pick up principles 
developed under United States antitrust legislation. 15" 
Thi paper is not concerned with s 2, which prohibits the etting up or attempted 
setting up of monopoly structures which, by definition, will have significant 
14 Sherman Act, SI, 26 Stal. 209 ( 1890) 
15 
Unio11 Shippi11g v Port Nelso11 Ltd [ 1990) 2 NZLR 662 at 700, per McGechan J and R G Blunt 
9 
market power and the consequent ability to influence pnce, supply and other 
factors within that market 16• 
2 Contracts Combinations and Conspiracies 
By referring to contracts combinations and conspiracies 17 in the Sherman Act, it i 
clear that s 1 is not concerned with the activities of one firm in isolation from 
other firms; it is only when restraint of trade arises from a "contract combination 
or conspiracy" that there is anything unlawful. 18 Hovenkampiiil 9 describes thi 
language as "vague and conclusory20" and says its "expansive text has always been 
the driving force in American antitrust policy21 ". 
16 This section however has no complete replacement in New Zealand, which has no specific 
prohibition against the establishment of a monopoly' 6 although the acquisition of 
dominance by merger or take-over activity is subject to Part Ill, Commerce Act 1986. 
Furthermore, any conspiracy to monopolize would, it appears, be subject to s 27. 
17 Kintner draws a distinction between contracts on the one hand and combinations and 
conspiracies on the other by citing, at page 13, from US v Kissel, 218 US 601, 608 which 
in his view distinguishes them on the basis that a combination or conspiracy is the re ult 
of an agreement rather than the agreement itself. A contract represents an instantaneous 
meeting of the minds at the time of execution; whereas combinations and conspiracies 
are said to have the character of continuance, since they frequently embrace acts 
performed over a period of time. He then says "Since any form of restraint of concerted 
activity by two or more persons in restraint of trade may be condemned, the technical 
discussions of contract, combination and conspiracy are not important to the application 
of s I." 
18 Kintner at page 19 says: "A single person or entity acting alone is not subject to the strictures 
of s I. Since the proscribed activities of contracting, combining or conspiring cannot be 
performed by a single person acting alone, it is well established that two or more per ons 
are necessary to form an actionable contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of 
trade." 
19 Hovenkamp, Page 48-9 
20 In this context, "conclusory" appears to mean inconclusive or requiring conclu ion to be 
drawn. 
21 In Standard Oil Co v United States, 221 US l, 59-60, the Supreme Court explained the width 
of the language on the following basis: 
" ... it was deemed essential by an all embracing enumeration to make sure that no form of 
contract or combination by which an undue restraint of interstate or foreign commerce 
was brought about could save such restraint from condemnation. The statute under this 
view evidenced the intent not to restrain the right to make and enforce contracts, whether 
resulting from combinations or otherwise, which did not unduly restrain interstate or 
foreign commerce, but to protect that commerce from being restrained by methods, old or 
new, which would constitute an interference - that is, an undue restraint." 
10 
After noting the wide range of factors providing a po sible justification, he 
suggests it is appropriate to regard the Sherman Act as to some extent replacing 
common law rules: 
"Most of the practices challenged under the Sherman Act had 
previously been addressed under common law rules. The framers of 
the Sherman Act believed that they were simply 'federalizing' the 
common law of trade restraints, making the common law more effective 
by creating a forum with jurisdiction over monopolies or cartels22 ... 23 " 
As Senator Sherman said in introducing the Act, it set "out in the most specific 
language
24 
the rule of the common law which prevails in England and this 
country ... 
25
" although in Hovenkamp's words "[t]he federal antitrust laws took on 
a life of their own. 26 " 
Thus, at least when introduced, the Act was directed at monopolies and cartels. 
Kintneriv saw the term "combination" as 
" ... the union or association of two or more persons to accomplish a 
common purpose. An essential element in the establishment of a 
combination is the conscious participation in the scheme by two or more 
minds ... The courts will infer the required consent or agreement where 
the party acquiesces to the acts in question with knowledge of their 
intended effect or where the acquiescence is the result of a 
coercive scheme. 27 " 
and described a conspiracy m terms of a joint undertaking with a common 
purpose, intent or design. In terms of knowledge of the participants, he says: 
22 
"A cartel is an agreement among firms who should be competitors to reduce their output to 
agreed upon levels, or to sell at an agreed upon price. The firms acting in concert can 
earn monopoly profits just as a single firm monopolist." Hovenkamp, page 140 23 
Hovenkamp, page 53. Underlining added. 
24 
Rather ironic, given later views as to the specificity of the language. 
25 
20 Cong.Ree 1167 ( 1889) 
26 Hovenkamp, page 53. 
27 
Kintner, page 6 -10. Emphasis added 
11 
"Those who, with knowledge of the conspiracy, aid or assist in carrying 
out the purposes of the conspiracy make themselves parties thereto 
and are equally liable or guilty with the original conspirators.. . Each 
party to the conspiracy need not have actual knowledge of every 
culpable transaction in question. It is enough that each conspirator 
knowingly participates in the common scheme in restraint of trade. 28" 
It is clear that it is not the form utilised by two or more firms seeking to effect a 
restraint of trade, but the fact that they are which is important to the operation of 
the section, as seen in Sullivan: v 
"[C]ontract...combination or conspiracy becomes an alliterative 
compound noun, roughly translated to mean 'concerted action'. There 
is little need to grapple with issues about the meanings of the particular 
words of the statute nor to mark distinctions between them29 " . 
He draws a distinction between horizontal and vertical relationships but only say 
"[T]he concept of concerted action goes through a subtle alteration 
where it reaches not across a single view of distribution, but up and 
down between two or more such levels." 
Finally in respect of the United States position, a very clear statement of the 
requirements in a horizontal context can be seen in American Tobacco Co v 
United States3°: 
"Where the circumstances are such as to warrant a jury in find ing that 
the conspirators had a unity of purpose or a common design and 
understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement3', 
the conclusion that a conspiracy is established is justified" 
28 Kintner page I 0. 
29 
Sullivan, page 312. Emphasis added 
30 328 us 781 , 763 (1946) 
31 
Emphasi added. It is not only necessary that there be a meeting of minds, the part ies minds' 
must meet in an unlawful arrangement. 
12 
As Hampton notes
32 
this i in the context of a case involving horizontal conduct. 
What "subtle alteration " are involved when the conduct is between firms in 
different levels, where the firms are unlikely to have the same purpose as each 
other when engaging in concerted action? According to Hampton: 
"American law deals with the issue by distinguishing between motive 
and objective. A useful starting point is the statement of the Supreme 
Court in Monsanto Co v Spray-Rite Service Corp33 that an agreement 
requires a showing of "a conscious commitment to a common scheme 
designed to achieve an unlawful objective. Commitment to the scheme 
is all important...As long as the parties are aware of the scheme's 
unlawful objective and partake in action that materially aids that 
objective they will be held to have engaged in concerted conduct. 34 " 
3 Resale Price Maintenance and Unilateral Refusals to Deal 
Two common situations of conduct between vertical segments of a market are 
resale price maintenance and unilateral refusals to deal. In order to consider the 
extent of participation required to constitute a breach, we can profit from a 
consideration of the United States treatment of these two schemes35 . 
At least when the Sherman Act was first enacted, there were no specific 
provi ions dealing with these situations. As a result, they came to be challenged 
under s 1. What is interesting is that the United State's courts did find that these 
arrangements did in some situations offend against the Sherman Act. Admittedly, 
even where there is a contract between a supplier and a purchaser which has the 
effect of restraining trade, the courts still look for a form of collusion as to the 
unlawful aspects of the contract. 
32 Hampton, page 4 
33 465 us 752, 763 ( 1963) 
34 Hampton, page 4 
35 To u c a neutral word 
13 
Unfortunately, words like collusion get u ed without any real attempt being made 
to define them. It obviously connotes two or more partie acting to some extent 
'in concert' anti-competitively. Beyond that, it is difficult to be more clear as to 
what amounts to collusion as various issues impact upon its meaning. For 
example, does 'acting in concert' require all parties to have knowledge, whether 
actual or constructive, of anti-competitive effect or will it suffice if one party the 
simply participates in some conduct of another (such as purchasing goods 
pursuant to a published price schedule) which is motivated by anti-competitive 
desires? Does collusion require that where one party has an anti-competitive 
purpose, the other parties must both know of and adopt that purpose? It is the 
difficulties in defining collusion which are at the heart of this paper. 
Utton vi devotes a chapter
36 
to discussion of the concept of collusion, which in his 
terms, obviously connotes some formality, in that he anticipates some monitoring 
and incentives to participate ( or at least disincentives to cheat) . It is this kind of 
structure which he sees as targeted by sl Sherman Acr17. He then gives38 an 
interesting definition of a 'concerted practice' from the European Court as 
"a form of co-ordination between undertakings which, without having 
reached the stage where an agreement properly so-called has been 
concluded, knowingly substitutes practical co-operation between them 
for the risks of competition . . . which becomes apparent from the 
behaviour of the undertakings.39 " 
Kintner40 says 
"Section 1 is directed only at joint action. For a contract, combination or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade to be actionable under s 1, concerted 
action must be present. Concerted action refers to two or more persons 
acting together pursuant to an agreement, express or implied. Some 
36 pages 144 - 171 
37 page 152 
38 page 159 
39 
IC/ v Commission (1972) CMLR 418 
40 page 19 
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degree of participation by at least two parties is essential to create a 
combination or conspiracy within the reach of s 1." 
The problem arose in the context of price fixing to determine the precise degree 
of participation needed on the part of those who wi hed to purchase supplies from 
a upplier who sought to dictate the price at which goods were to be resold. In 
many situations, the supplier would simply refuse to deal with those who did not 
agree to its terms. Concerted horizontal price fixing could easily be identified as 
in breach of the Act but: 
"In any appraisal of the various forms of price fixing today, however, 
one should not ignore the fundamental bipartite distinction between 
'horizontal' and "vertical' price-fixing... Vertical price-fixing occurs within 
a single chain of distribution where, for example, a manufacturer makes 
an agreement with a wholesaler or retailer (or both) whereby the 
wholesaler or retailer is to re-sell the manufactured product at a certain 
price, above a stated minimum price, or below a stated maximum 
price. .. Vertical price-fixing is also commonly known as a resale price 
maintenance. 41 " 
In 1911, an example of RPM was declared to be illegal under the Sherman Act. 42 
In this case, a supplier of medical products had a system of contracts with 
wholesalers jobbers and retailers, the purpose of which was to fix minimum prices 
at which goods could be re-sold at wholesale and retail. One wholesaler refused 
to enter, obtained medicines at cut price and induced some of tho e who had 
entered contracts with the Plaintiff to breach them by supplying the Defendant. 
The validity of the arrangement under s I was the central is ue. 43 As the contract 
eliminated competition, they therefore restrained trade. As the scheme put 
together by the Plaintiff had the pro cribed effect, it was illegal.44 Obviously, each 
41 Kintner page 67 
42 
Dr Miles Medical Co v John D Park & Sons Co 220 US 373, 31 S Ct 376 (1911) 
43 
As again in the News Media case in Australia in 1996! 
44 Hovingkamp at pages 56 - 59 notes that decisions such as this one, which held that RPM was 
in breach of s 1 Sherman Act lead to the Miller - Tydings Act of 1937, 50 Stal 693 which 
permitted states to authorise RPM, but which was then overturned by the Consumer 
Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stal 801 
15 
participant at least had knowledge that the Plaintiff wa attempting to set resale 
prices and would therefor remove fears of price competition from other suppliers 
of the same products. Apart from that, there appears to have been no enquiry into 
the purposes or motives of the participants. 
Although it is a case involving concerted action among a number of wholesalers 
attempting to dictate resale prices, United States v Trenton Potteries Co45 clearly 
expressed the evils of price fixing: 
"The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the 
elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether 
reasonably exercised or not, involves power to control the market and to 
fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices." 
United States v Colgate & Co46 marks the high point of the legitimacy of Resale 
Price Maintenance under s I. In that case, Colgate made strenuous efforts to 
ensure that all those to whom it supplied its products re old at prices specified by 
Colgate and refused to supply those who would not adhere to its terms of trade. 47 
Essentially, the dealers became obligated not to resell except at agreed prices but 
the court simply saw this as the right of customer selection, saying: 
"In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the 
Sherman Act does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or 
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise 
his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal; 
45 273 US 392, at 397 
46 250 US 300, 39 S Ct 465 ( 1919) 
47 
The indictment alleged the following conduct: "Distribution among dealers of letters, 
telegrams, circulars, and lists showing uniform prices to be charged; urging them to 
adhere to such prices and notices, stating that no sales would be made to those who did 
not, requests, often complied with, for information concerning dealers who had departed 
from specified prices; invstigation and discovery of those not adhering thereto and 
placing their names upon 'suspended' lists; requests to offending dealers for assurances 
and promises of future adherence to prices, which were often given; uniform refusals to 
sell to any who failed to give the same; sales to those who did; similar assurances and 
promises required of, and given by, other dealers followed by sales to them, unrestricted 
sales to dealers with established accounts who had observed pecified prices, etc" quoted 
at 306. 
16 
and, of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under 
which he will refuse to sell. 48" 
As this was the basis on which the Supreme Court allowed the conduct, obviously 
there was no need to enquire into the attitudes or purposes of the dealer . 
Although it might be reasonable to suppose that given the option of accepting 
Colgate's terms or not having its products to sell, avoidance of tho e 
consequences would be the primary motive rather than any anti-competitive 
purpose, this could be seen as a form of coercion and thereby satisfying the 
element of collusion. This was not the approach taken however, although this 
case has been narrowly interpreted in later decisions.49 
In Schrader the court said it 
"had no intention [in Colgate] to overrule or modify the doctrine in [Dr 
Miles] where the effort was to destroy the dealers' independent 
discretion through restrictive agreements .. . 
"It seems unnecessary to dwell upon the obvious difference between 
the situation presented when a manufacturer merely indicates his 
wishes concerning prices and declines further dealings with all those 
who fail to observe them, and one where he enters into agreements -
whether express or implied from a course of dealing or other 
circumstances - with all customers throughout the different States which 
undertake to bind them to observe fixed resale prices. " 
In Beech-Nut: 
"By these decisions it is settled that, in prosecutions under the Sherman 
Act, a trader is not guilty of violating its terms who simply refuses to sell 
to others, and he may withhold his goods from those who will not sell 
them at the prices which he fixes for their resale. He may not, 
consistently with the act, go beyond the exercise of this right, and by 
48 
United States v Colgate at page 307. In this way, the Supreme Court di stinguished Dr Miles 
Medical v John D Park 
49 
In both United States v A Schrader's Son, Inc 252 US 85 at 99, 40 S Ct 251 at 265 ( 1920) and 
Federal Trade Commission v Beech-Nut Packing Co. 257 US 441 , 42 S Ct 150 ( 1922) 
the Court di stinguished Colgate. 
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contracts or combinations, express or implied, unduly hinder or obstruct 
the free and natural flow of commerce in the channels of interstate 
trade. uSO 
As Beech Nut had an elaborate enforcement scheme, it had gone beyond mere 
exercise of the right of customer selection and setting re ale price terms, partly 
because it used others to bring about adherence to sugge ted resale prices, which 
took the conduct from the sphere of unilateral refusal to deal into an attempt to 
maintain prices "by utilizing ... co-operative means51 ". 
Finally in this context, it is worth noting the Supreme Court tatement in United 
States v Parke-Davis & Co. :52 
"In other words, an unlawful combination is not just such as arises from 
a price maintenance agreement, express or implied; such a combination 
is also organised if the producer secures adherence to his suggested 
prices by means which go beyond his mere declination to sell to a 
customer who will not obseNe his announced policy." 
A key passage is: 
"It was only by actively bringing about substantial unanimity among the 
competitors that Parke, Davis was able to gain adherence to its policy. 
It must be admitted that a seller's announcement that he will not deal 
with customers who do not obseNe his policy may tend to engender 
confidence in each customer that if he complies his competitors will 
5° Federal Trade Commission v Beech-Nut Packing Co 257 US 441, at 452-3. One of the e 'co-
operative means' was to induce or compel jobbers, whole alers and retailers not only to 
maintain its fixed resale prices but also to induce them to discontinue selling products to 
other jobbers wholesalers and retailers who did not maintain the resale prices. This 
violated s 1 Sherman Act 
Another important case in this area is that of United States v Bausch & Lomb Optical Co 321 
US 707 (I 944) although that case did involve whole alers agreeing to "police" the 
scheme. According to Kintner, page 137, this case marked the fir t time that the court 
expressly stated that actual agreement between two or more parties was not necessary to 
constitute a violation of s 1 when it said "Whether the conspiracy or combination was 
acheived by agreement or by acquiescence of the wholesalers coupled with assistance in 
effectuating its purpose is immaterial." at 723 
51 Kintner page 122 
52 362 US 29 at 43( 1959) 
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also. But if a manufacturer is unwilling to rely on individual self 
interest to bring about general voluntary acquiescence which has the 
collateral effect of eliminating price competition, and takes affirmative 
action to achieve uniform adherence by inducing each customer to 
adhere to avoid such price competition, the customers' acquiescence is 
not then a matter of individual free choice prompted alone by the 
desirability of the product. The product then comes packaged in a 
competition-free wrapping - a valuable feature in itself - by virtue of 
concerted action induced by the manufacturer. The manufacturer is 
thus the organizer of a price maintenance combination or conspiracy in 
violation of the Sherman Act. 53 " 
Having said that, the Colgate doctrine still has some validity, as seen in Garrett 's 
Inc v Farah Manufacturing Co54 where the manufacturer became aware that a 
firm it was supplying was discounting the product. As a consequence, the 
manufacturer ceased to supply it any further, but without involving any other 
party. The court held that there was no more than a unilateral act of customer 
selection, not a breach of the Act. 
4 Individual Purpose or Intention 
One matter which is made plain by the wording of the Act is that there is no 
obvious requirement to consider the purpose or intention of the parties to the 
contract combination or conspiracy. 
As Areeda
55 
says, it is often claimed that an agreement cannot breach the 
Sherman Act unless there is some purpose or effect to restrain trade. He goes on 
to say 
"Intention is often superfluous to the analysis of reasonableness, for it 
adds nothing to the conduct from which it is usually inferred ... To focus 
on an unreasonable intent that is inferred from undesirable conduct is 
simply to add an unnecessary step to the analysis." 
53 Parke, Davis page 46-7 
54 412 F Supp 656 (1976) 
55 para 1506 
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He then demonstrate what he calls the "subordinate role of state of mind" by 
pointing out that an "innocent mental state" will never redeem conduct otherwise 
unlawful for being uncompetitive. 
Utton56 is to similar effect, where he says that even from the earliest cases, the US 
Supreme Court saw justification as irrelevant57 
5 Summary 
To summarise the United States approach, it is clear that one firm can devise 
some scheme in restraint of trade but it will not become actionable under s 1 
unless other firms participate in it. 
In the resale price maintenance and refusal to deal context, it is not the complying 
with the supplier's demands which constitutes the required degree of participation; 
rather that they decide to participate knowing that other participants will be 
bound not to act competitively and take advantage of it. Even that may be 
insufficient but it is clear that if any assist the supplier with its objective of fixing 
resale prices, then a "contract combination or conspiracy" is established. 
On the other hand, it does appear that, particularly given the Parke, Davis 
decision that if a customer act purely through self interest without any kind of 
pressure, coercion or inducement then there will not be a breach of s J. As a 
result, if a firm with the objective of excluding entrant to or squeezing existing 
56 page 153 
57 
He cites United States v Trans-Missouri Freight Association 166 US 290 (1897) where a price 
fixing agreement which arguably limited prices to a 'reasonable' rate was struck down; 
competition should determine the 'reasonable' price, not the railroad companies. Despite 
ome relaxation in the depression years, United States v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co Inc 310 
US 150 ( 1940) is the 'established precedent' to the per se illegality of price fixing, 
irresepctive of purpose. As Justice Douglas wrote "Under the Sherman Act a 
combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing , 
pegging or stabilising the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is 
illegal per se". There appears to be relaxation where there is a pro-competitive effect as 
in Broadcast Music Inc v Columbia Broadcasting System Inc 441 US I ( 1979) which 
upheld a system of blanket licences which set fees for royalties to compensate the 
compo ers of music. 
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competitor out of a market, lowers its prices and self interested customer simply 
take advantage of those prices, there will not be an unlawful re traint of trade 
unles at the very least those customers have some form of knowledge of the 
firm's objective when they contract with it, although even this may not be 
sufficient to establish a "commitment" on the part of those customers to the 
scheme. 
Applying this matrix to the facts of recent New Zealand cases, it is clear that the 
situation in Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland 
Airport) Ltct5
8 
would be in breach. In that case, the airport authority, in order to 
maximise revenue from rental car concessions, decided to limit the number to two 
and charge a premium to the successful applicants. Those applicants, on the other 
hand, were willing to pay the premium (which on the face of it was contrary to 
self interest) in order to exclude competition. 
It is equally clear that the facts in Commerce Commission v Port Nelson Ltct59 
would not qualify as a breach. There, the Port Company reduced certain charges 
below break-even point and allowed a global discount over a range of services, 
some of which were contestable and others were not in order to make life difficult 
(at least) for an entrant in a contestable service. The customers were never fixed 
with knowledge of the Port Company's purpose so, in taking advantage of the 
pricing regime and discount, can not be seen as committing to it. 
58 
[ 1987) 2 NZLR 647 
59 (1995) 5 NZBLC 103,762 
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B Australian Approach 
1 Trade Practices Act 
Australia adopted virtually identical wording to the Sherman Act in s 4, 
Australian Industries Preservation Act (Cth) 1906, abandoned that approach in 
1967 but returned to it with the Trade Practices Act (Cth) 1974. As was written 
in 1985: 
"The legislation returns to the proscriptive approach of the Australian 
Industries Preservation Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act upon which it 
was based:;.so" 
When one considers the original wording of s 45 Trade Practices Act (Cth) 1974, 
the borrowing from the Sherman Act is evident. Subsection 45( 1) was in the 
following terms: 
(1) A contract in restraint of trade or commerce ... is unenforceable .. . 
Of course, an argument can be mounted that all contracts nece sarily involve 
some restraint of trade because when two parties agree on the performance of 
ome obligation in exchange for some consideration, they are excluding other 
from performing the obligation in that particular instance. In other words: 
"Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. 
To bind, to restrain is of the very essence. The true test of legality is 
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps 
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or 
even destroy competition. 61 " 
60 
Trade Practices Reporter vol I Para 280, p 513 (1985 version of the looseleaf service) 
61 
Board of Trade of City of Chicago v United States 246 US 231 ( 1918) 
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To meet this difficulty, by subsection 45(4) a contract arrangement or 
understanding would only be in restraint of trade if it had certain defined effects 
on competition. 
As a result of the decision in Quadramann Pty Ltd v Sevastapol Investments 
Ltrf
2
, s 45 was amended to remove the reference to "restraint of trade" and, so far 
as is presently relevant, reads: 
(2) A corporation shall not: 
(a) make a contract or arrangement, or arrive at an 
understanding, if: 
(ii) a provision of the proposed contract, arrangement or 
understanding has the purpose, or would have or be 
likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening 
competition . 
Comments about the status of the Sherman Act and United States decisions in 
Australian courts when called upon to deal with the Trade Practices Act are 
numerous. As one example, Lockhart J in the context of an allegation of price 
fixing in breach of s 45A said: 
"My approach to the construction and operation of s 45A is generally in 
accord with the approach taken by the courts of the United States of 
America in decisions under the Sherman Act.63 " 
62 
( 1976) 133 CLR 390. This involved an application by one hotelier to enforce a covenant 
undertaken by his neighbour not to apply for a liqour licence. The High Court held that 
because it was a covenant running with the land, it was not a contract in restraint of trade 
in the sense meant in Esso Petroleum Co v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd [ 1968] AC 
269 and therefore was not the the type of restraint contemplated by s 45. 
63 
Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Stereo FM Pty Ltd (1982) 44 ALR 557, 568. He went on to 
identify that approach "They reflect the concern of those courts to carefully consider the 
relevant conduct before characterizing it as an arrangement in restraint of price 
competition and they distinguish between arrangements which directly or indirectly 
restrain price competition and those which merely incidentally affect it. 
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2 Must there be Shared Purpose? 
Unlike the American legi lation, purpose 1s introduced as a factor for 
consideration. One danger in dealing with the Australian legislation is that the 
phrase "contract arrangement or understanding" appears in a number of contexts 
within the Act coupled with the concept of purpose.64 
As a consequence, there is an evident conceptual fluidity to this term 'purpose' 
and, as will be discussed, judicial statements as to the meaning of purpose in one 
context may not necessarily hold true in another. 
A very clear statement was made in the Radio 2 UE case, where Lockhart J said: 
"Section 45A can have no application unless there is some form of 
arrangement between people. There can be no arrangement without 
each of the parties communicating with each other and raising an 
expectation in the mind of the other. Otherwise there is no requisite 
meeting of the minds. There must be a consensus as to what is to be 
done and not just a mere hope as to what might be done or happen.65 " 
In this case however, the allegedly offending conduct was between competitors 
and the primary issue in that case was whether what they had done amounted to a 
"contract arrangement or understanding" to fix prices which, if proved, would 
have deemed the arrangement to be for the purpose of substantially lessening 
64 
As examples, s 45(2)(a)(ii) is concerned with whether the purpose of a provisione within a 
contract arrangement or understanding is to substantially lessen competition; in s 45A the 
provisione is deemd to have that purpose if the provision has the purpose of fixing prices 
between competing parties to the contract arrangement or understanding. On the other 
hand, in s 45D, the prohibition is against persons engaging in conduct with another to 
hinder supplies from a third party to a fourth for the purpose of damaging that fourt party 
or substantially lessening competition. The concern here is not with the purpose of a 
provision but the purpose of conduct. Similarly, s 47( 10) defines exclusive dealing in 
terms of particular conduct engaged in by a corporation for the purpose of substantially 
lessening competition. As prohibitions within s 47 are also expressed in terms of conduct 
engaged in for particular prohibited reasons (subsections (3) and (5)) we cannot equate 
purpose with reasons 
65 page 43,920 
tl6R 
~ERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
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competition. As a result, there was no need for the court to be concerned with 
any question of divergent purposes on the part of he alleged parties. 
This ea e was following Trade Practices Commission v Nicholas Enterprises Pty 
Ltcf
6 
which is often cited as the source of the authority that for s 45(2)(a)(ii) to 
operate, there must be a meeting of mjnds and each party must have raised an, 
expectation in the mjnds of the other. 
That case involved an allegation that a number of hotels had reached an 
arrangement or understanding (there being no evidence to support a contractual 
agreement) that they would reduce the "allowance" on the purchase of a dozen to 
beer from three bottles to two (a device to bypass price controls imposed by 
conditions attached to liquor licenses). 
The pnmary issue to be resolved was the meaning of an arrangement or 
understanding, and in particular, the extent to which a "meeting of mjnds" wa 
necessary. His Honour quoted from Re Basic Slag Ltd's Agreements (British 
Basic Slag Ltd v Registrar of Restrictive Trade Practices)67 : 
" ... there may be arrangements which may not be enforceable by legal 
proceedings, but which create only moral obligations or obligations 
binding in honour ... For when each of two or more parties intentionally 
arouses in the others an expectation that he will act in a certain way, it 
seems to me that he incurs at least a moral obligation to do so. An 
arrangement as so defined is therefore something 'whereby the parties 
to it accept mutual rights and obligations.'68" 
He then noted the Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Lutovi Investments Pty 
Ltcf9 statement that: 
66 
( 1979) 40 FLR 83 per Fisher J 
67 
[1963) I WLR 727 which involved s 6(1) Restrictive Trade Practices Act (UK) 1956 which 
was expressed in terms of an arrangement "between two or more persons" . 
68 page 739 
69 
( 1978) 53 ALJR 152 
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"an arrangement should be consensual, and that there should be some 
adoption of it. But. .. it is not essential that the parties are committed to it 
or are bound to support it. 70" 
Returning to the Basic Slag case, His Honour went on to find that the essential 
elements of the requisite meeting of minds to constitute an arrangement were: 
1. Communication between each of the alleged parties; 
2. Each to have raised an expectation in the minds of the other; and' 
3. Each to have accepted an obligation qua the other.71 
He reinforced this view by quoting from Top Performance Motors Pty Ltd v Ira 
Berk ( Queensland) Pty Ltd
72 
where after noting s 45 Trade Practices Act ( Cth) 
I 974 was not in the same terms ass 6(1) of the UK legislation, it was said: 
"but by parity of reasoning it would follow that the existence of an 
arrangement of the kind contemplated in s. 45 is conditional upon a 
meeting of the minds of the parties to the arrangement in which one 
of them is understood, by the other or others, and intends to be so 
understood, as undertaking ... to regard himself as being in some degree 
under a duty, moral or legal, to conduct himself in some particular way, 
at any rate so long as the other party or parties conducted themselves 
in the way contemplated by the arrangement. 
"It seems to me also that an understanding must involve the meeting of 
two or more minds. Where the minds of the parties are at one that a 
proposed transaction proceeds on the basis of the maintenance of a 
particular state of affairs or the adoption of a particular course of 
conduct, it would seem that there would be an understanding within the 
meaning of the Act. 13 " 
70 page 154 
71 
On appeal, Bowen CJ found "It seems to me that one could have an understanding between 
two or more persons restricted to the conduct which one of them will pursue without any 
element of mutual obligation, in so far as the other party or parties to the understanding 
are concerned." Morphett Amis Hotel Pty Ltd v TPC (1980) ATPR 40-157 
72 
( I 975) A TPR 40,004 
73 page 17, I 16. Emphasis added. 
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The first of these paragraphs seem to impo e a requirement of shared purpose 
but it must be said that in Nicholas Enterprises, it was clear that the alleged 
parties had the requisite shared purposes (reflected in their adopting the ame 
pricing); the issue being as to whether their respective minds had met in such a 
way to create an arrangement or under tanding. 
His Honour did however say that "prima facie in my opinion an understanding is 
reached by two persons each with the other and there is no suggestion that it can 
be unilateral74". This was in the context of a Trade Practices Commi sion 
submission that an understanding was made out as soon as one person at a 
particular lunch announced he would be reducing the bonus bottles on a particular 
date; his commitment would suffice to establish an under tanding, as soon as 
others followed suit, even in the absence of communication of the similar conduct. 
It was still required that the persons to whom the proposal (even if it was an 
undertaking) adopt it themselves to constitute an arrangement. 
Having found that the various publicans had reached an arrangement, he still had 
to consider whether it was in breach of s 45 by a king whether there was a 
provision which had the purpose, effect or likely effect of sub tantially le ening 
competition. This could be satisfied simply by the TPC establishing there was a 
purpose of fixing prices, without considering the further purpo e of price fixing. 
As the result of the arrangement was to increa e the price of beer old by all 
parties, there was no room to doubt that the purpose or effect was price fixing. 
As the partie satisfied the further requirement of being in competition with each 
other, there was a breach. 
The need for shared purpose came, albeit obliquely, before the court in Trade 
Practices Commission v Email Ltd75. The two Australian manufacturers of 
electrical metering equipment (where Email had 60 to 70% of the market) 
produced identical price lists, supplied them to each other, adopted similar 
74 page 18,347 
75 
( 1980) 43 FLR 383 per Lockhart J 
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contractual pnce clauses with their customers and, when tendering for work 
(which was the source of the majority of work) tendered strictly in accordance 
with their (identical) price lists. 
The court accepted this was a pure oligopoly, where each firm necessarily had to 
match the others or risk failure. 76 Here the parallel conduct was the result of 
market forces, not collusion.77 
The Trade Practices Commission nonetheless argued a breach of s 45(2)( a)( ii) on 
the basis of the forwarding of the price lists.78 It simply asserted the 
communication constituted the necessary meeting of minds and gave rise to an 
expectation of inhibited conduct on the part of the other party when it came to 
setting prices, arguing that only one party to the arrangement needed to be 
inhibited. 79 Lockhart J in respon e said: 
"For my part, I find it difficult to envisage circumstances where there 
would be an understanding involving a commitment by one party as to 
the way in which he should behave without some commitment by the 
other party. Unless there is some reciprocity of commitment I do not 
readily see why the parties would come to an arrangement or 
understanding. "80 
Nonetheless: 
76 It is worth noting in this context that in a purely competitive market, one of the assumptions 
is that all information is instantly known. As a result, the sharing of prices could be 
characterised as going some way to create perfect competition, rather than lessening it. 
Further discussion of oligopolistic markets is contained in Appendix Two. 77 page 391 
78 It did not argue there had been discussions nor contend that the prices would have not been 
substantially the same without the communication 
79
This was in reliance on a statement in Morphett Arms Hotel Pty Ltd v Trade Practices 
Commission:(1980) 30 ALR 88, 91-2, an appeal from the Nicholas Enterprise case: "(I]t 
seems to me that one could have an understanding between two or more persons 
restricted to the conduct which one of them will pursue without any element of mutual 
obligation, in so far as the other party or parties to the understanding are concerned." 80 page 397 
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" ... I incline to the view that there is no necessity for an element of 
mutual commitment between the parties to an arrangement or 
understanding such that each accepts an obligation qua the other; 
although in practice such cases would be rare." 
On the facts, neither party considered itself as under any obligation to the other to 
forward or match prices but rather this was done without any arrangement or 
understanding for sound commercial reasons. 
These cases demonstrate that the courts are looking for some form of mutuaJly 
consensual behaviour before finding a breach of ss 45A and 45(2)(a)(ii). It is 
important to bear in mind the important quaJification to the former that the price 
fixing must have effect across competitors (i.e. horizontally). 
As recently as 1989, Heydon viii wrote m terms of collusion being essential to 
constitute a breach of ss 45 - 45c. He writes: 
"When will firms have reached the type of understanding or 
arrangement that must be examined in the context of its impact upon 
competition? How will it be proven that they have acted in concert? 
The statutory words are 'contract arrangement or understanding'. They 
suggest collusion, a 'meeting of minds', a consensus plan, having an 
anti-competitive purpose or an anti-competitive effect. There have been 
various detailed formulations of the elements of the consensus, but 
when reconsidered they do not take the matter very far."81 
Interestingly, he goes back to the Coal Vend case82 as providing the best study of 
proof of arrangements. After noting that "combination", "arrangement ", 
81 
para 4.260, page 2081. Despite this being a looseleaf service, the learned author seems to 
have seen no reason to have altered his views in recent years although he does discuss the 
decision in ASX Opertaions Pty Ltd v Pont Data Systems Australia Pty Ltd ( 199 I) A TPR 
41-069 in paragraph 1.1305 at page 803 in relation to its impact on the meaning of 
purpo e. 
82 ( 1911) 14CLR387 
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"conspiracy" and "understanding" were used interchangeably83 he quotes the 
following passage: 
"Community of purpose may be proved by independent facts, but it 
need not be. If the other defendant is shown to be committing other 
acts, tending to the same end, then though primarily each set of acts is 
attributable to the person whose acts they are, and to him alone, there 
may be such a concurrence of time, character, direction and result as 
naturally to lead to the inference that these separate acts were the 
outcome of pre-concert, or some mutual contemporaneous 
engagement, or that they were themselves the manifestations of mutual 
consent to carry out a common purpose, thus forming as well as 
evidencing a combination to effect the one object towards which the 
separate acts are found to converge."84 
The importance of this is that he regards "community of purpose" as an es ential 
ingredient and cites long established authority as to how that might be proved. If 
community of purpose is not an essential ingredient, why then is there such an 
effort made to establish it? 
The learned author then claims that the "most difficult question" 85 in this context 
is the nature of communication necessary to constitute an arrangement or 
understanding and concludes by saying communication between the parties i an 
essential element.
86 
There is no appearance of any recognition that there might be 
some contract arrangement or understanding in a vertical context where there i a 
disparity in purposes in entering the arrangement. 
As his analysis of what he calls "the problem of mutuality "87 is entirely in terms of 
what external uniformity of conduct can be used to e tablish an agreement or 
arrangement, it is clear he can only see s 45 as being breached by collu ive 
conduct, the primary difficulty being in terms of proof of collu 10n. 
83 para 4.270, page 2082 
84 page 400, per Isaacs J 
85 para 4.290, page 2085 
86 para 4.320, page 2087 
87 
para 4.340, page 2 111 
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3 Refusals To Deal 
As might be expected, the problem of refusals to deal has ari en in Australia and 
fallen to be considered under both s 45(2)(a)(ii) and 47(10). In Dandy Power 
Equipment Pty Ltd v Mercury Marine Pty Lt~8 Mercury refused to continue 
supplying Dandy with Mercury outboards because Dandy was stocking a 
competitor's products. Dandy alleged a breach of s 47(10), contending Dandy' 
conduct had the purpose or effect of substantially lessening competition. 
Purpose of conduct suggests something quite different from the purpose of a 
provision in a contract. In establishing the meaning of purpose in this context, 
Smithers J said: 
"The interpretation of the reference to "purpose" in s 47(10) depends 
upon the nature of the enactment and the context in which the particular 
provision appears. The nature of Part IV of the Act is that it aims to 
ensure a state of competitive trading by providing rules of conduct, 
penalties and remedies to persons who suffer if the rules are 
contravened ... In Hecar Investments No 6 Pty Ltd v Outboard Marine 
Australia Pty Ltd (1982) ATPR 40-298 Franki J indicated that the test of 
purpose under s 47(10) was a subjective one. I think he was using the 
term subjective in the sense that the purpose was actually in the mind of 
the person engaging in that conduct. 89 " 
After considering the wording of s 47( 10) he said: 
"The purpose to be identified is the purpose which the engaging in the 
relevant conduct 'has'. This is a form of words hardly apt to refer to the 
subjective purpose of the person performing the relevant act and apt to 
induce an objective rather than a subjective approach. 90" 
88 (1982) ATPR 40-3 15 
89 page 43,897 
90 page 43,898 
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In support of this proposition, he quoted from Slutzkin v Commissioner of 
Taxation 91 : 
" ... It has long been settled that s 260 [Income Tax Assessment Act 
1936] is not concerned with the subjective motives or the intentions of 
taxpayers but with the character of the acts done and transactions 
entered into ... [W]hat must be looked at is the 'overt acts by which it [i.e. 
the arrangement] was implemented in order to ascertain its purpose." 
In Tillmanns Butcheries Pty Ltd v The Australasian Meat Industry Employees 
Union
92 
Deane J had noted a disparity between s 45D( 1) and s 260 Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 and held that "The 'purpose' referred to in s 45D(l) is the 
operative subjective purpose of those engaging in the relevant conduct in 
concert." Smithers J compared s 47( 10) and s 260 and said: 
"But in relation to the form of words in s 47(10) the contrast is not to be 
seen. Both s 260 and s 47(10) are dealing with the nature of conduct 
rather than the minds of actors. Accordingly, there is much to be said 
for the view that the purpose referred to in s 47(10) is the purpose to be 
attributed to the act of engaging in the relevant conduct as revealed by 
the nature and character of that act. If this be correct the plaintiff will 
succeed in establishing the relevant purpose if it proves that the overt 
acts done in the course of engaging in the conduct were intrinsically of 
such a character that it is proper to infer therefrom that the purpose of 
the engaging in those acts was to substantially lessen competition in a 
relevant market. 93 " 
What this is establishing is that by referring to the 'conduct', the legislation is to be 
taken as concerned with an objective as essment of the purpose of one party in 
engaging in that conduct. Applying this rationale to this arena seems entirely 
consistent with the United States approach where laudatory ubjective intentions 
will not rescue conduct which otherwise contravenes the Sherman Act. As has 
been noted, the subjective intention of the parties are not relevant. On the other 
9 1 
(1977) 140 CLR 314 at 329 
92 
( 1979) A TPR 40- 138 at 18-500 
93 page 43,899 
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hand, it does need to be borne in mind that the wording of the Sherman Act 
makes no reference to purpose at all, which emphasises a more objective 
approach. 
In ASX Operations Pty Ltd v Pont Data Systems Australia Pty Lt~4• the 
Australian courts had to grapple for the first time with the problem of unilateral 
behaviour and a purpose of sub tantially lessening competition which wa not 
shared by all parties. 
There, ASXO was the sole supplier of certain stockmarket data. Pont' s bu ines 
was the obtaining of stockmarket and other data from a number of source and 
selling the combined information as a wholesaler to retailers, such as financial 
analysts. ASXO, through a subsidiary, was also engaged in selling the 
stockmarket information to retailers. Pont required access to the ASXO data in 
order to survive in the particular business and as a competitor to the ASXO 
subsidiary. The essence of the problem is neatly summed up in the following: 
"The present is a case in which two parties, Pont and ASXO, are both 
rivals and at the same time ASXO is the sole supplier to Pont...of 
information which is essential to them if they are to continue to compete 
with ASXO in the services they offer to third parties. 95 " 
Although ASXO did allow Pont access to the data, it only did so on the ba is that 
Pont enter into three contracts restricting the use to which Pont could put the 
data. As an example, it could not on-sell immediately current data (which was 
critical) without paying fees for each 'access' to the data which customer of the 
ASXO subsidiary did not need to pay. 
Pont commenced court proceedings, alleging, inter alia, a breach of s 45(2)(a)(ii) 
which is functionally identical to s 27 Commerce Act 1986. The court had little 
difficulty in finding that ASXO's purpose in including the restrictions in the 
94 
(I 99 I ) A TPR 41-069 
95 Page 52,053 
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contracts was to pre erve the wholesale market for ASXO (and so to Jes en 
competition within that market). The issue then became one of whether ASXO's 
purpose could be equated with that of the contract itself or whether the contract 
was likely to have the effect of lessening competition. 
The Full Federal Court noted that for s 4696 the subjective purpose of those 
engaging in the relevant conduct was to be ascertained97 but there was the 
"undoubted curiosity of legislation which speaks of the purposes of a provi ion, 
not of the purposes of those who devised and propounded the provision".98 
Furthermore, Pont had entered the agreements solely because it was essential to 
have access to the data, which would have been with-held had they not igned. In 
their submission, they were party to the contracts but not any anti-competitive 
purpose because it was a victim of any anti-competitive effect. The que tion was 
then asked (and it is a critical question in this context): 
"Where not all the parties have the necessary subjective purpose, how 
is one to describe the contract they make as having a particular purpose 
in this sense?" 
It is perhaps unfortunate that the question was framed in such a way as it uggest 
a willingness to strain the meaning of the Act's wording to bring such a situation 
within it's ambit. Certainly, this was the result reached by the Full Federal Court, 
by referring to the interpretation given contract arrangement or understanding in 
the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. It noted that "purpose" in that context had 
been defined as "not motive, but the effect which it is sought to achieve - the end 
in view"99 and that it meant omething more than being able to characterise a 
particular arrangement a a "tax dodge" 100. Ultimately however, the court said 
96 Trade Practices Act (Cth) 1974 the equivalent of the New Zealand s 36 Commerce Act 1936 
97 citing Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association ( Inc) & Ors ( 19860 A TPR 40-736 at 
48,043-45. 
98 page 52,059 
99 Newton v Federal Commisioner of Taxation 11 ATD 442 at 445. With respect, that seems 
rather to beg the question of by whom it is necessary that the effect be sought, all parties 
or just one? 
'
00 Federal Commisioner of Taxation v Gulland 85 ATC 4765 at 4787 where it was clear that 
the focus was necessarily, because of authority, on the form of a transaction rather than 
its substance 
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that decisions under that Act didn't nece sarily support any particular 
interpretation of the Trade Practices Act 1974 because it "is concerned with very 
d'f• b' 11101 1 1erent u ~ect matter . 
Attention was then paid to the effect of Section 4F02 which was clearly inserted 
to deal with the issue of multiple purposes, in that it provide that a provision has 
a purpose (les ening competition for example) if it was included for the particular 
purpose (of lessening competition) or that purpose was a substantial reason for its 
inclusion. 
This was seized on as providing "considerable assistance" 103 as: 
"Section 4F makes it plain that it is sufficient that a purpose was or is a 
substantial purpose, whether one is construing a section which is 
addressed to have a particular purpose ... It also makes it clear that it is 
sufficient that the proscribed purpose was included in other purposes. '04 " 
Furthermore 
" ... s 4F, in this operation, requires one to look to the purposes of the 
individuals by whom the provision was included in the contract 
arrangement or understanding... It therefore directs attention to the 
'subjective' purposes of those individuals." 
According to the Full Federal Court, this required a subjective consideration as to 
why provisions were included. As Pont alleged the provisions were included only 
because of ASXO's insistence, it became appropriate to look to ASXO's purposes, 
as the provisions were included as a result of its efforts. After finding that the 
agreements had the likely effect of sub tantiaJly le sening competition, insofar as 
they required disclosure to ASXO of Pont's customers and prohibited 
wholesaling, the court held that that was sufficient to uphold the lower court's 
101 
page 52060 
102 
Largely similar to the s 2(5) Commerce Act definition of purpose 
103 page 52,060 
104 page 52,060 
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findings and was not prepared to infer a purpo e of substantially lessening 
competition. 
Given that the Full Federal Court chose not to make a finding as to whether the 
purpose breached s 45(2)( a)( ii), its decision on the meaning of purpo e in that 
context is strictly obiter dicta. 
With respect there does appear to have been something of an exaggerated 
importance given to s 4F, which is really only a machinery provi ion to assist in 
interpreting the substantive provisions of the Act. That section clearly allows a 
court, when faced with a number of purposes for a provision to find a breach, so 
long as one of the purposes offends against the Act. It gives no obvious warrant 
however for regarding an objectionable purpose of only one party being ufficient. 
In the Australian context anyway, one particular argument again t this 
interpretation is that there appears to be no difference in sub tance between the 
purpose of conduct105 and the purpose of a provision in a contract. It seems that 
both can be established by finding the objectively determined subjective purpose 
of one party. This can only be viewed as contrary to the mo t ba ic principles of 
statutory interpretation, namely that if different words are deliberately chosen, 
that is a strong indication of an intended difference in meaning. 
Having said that, there is considerable consistency with the approach taken in the 
United States, although no cases from that jurisdiction appear to have been cited 
before the court. There, a distinction has been drawn between coercive 
'schemes,1°6 organised by one firm and other schemes in which participation is 
purely on the basis of commercial self-interest. Even when 'down tream' firm 
have been coerced into participation, the scheme will be regarded as a contract 
combination or conspiracy, with one policy justification being that there is then an 
incentive on those forced to participate to involve the regulatory authorities to 
break the combination. Quite plainly, Pont Data had knowledge of the anti-
105 as detennined in the Dandy Power Equipment Pty Ltd v Mercury Marine case. 
106 this is intended to be a neutral tenn, not necessarily depicting something which is within or 
without the tatutory prohibition. 
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competitive purposes of ASX and was coerced into adopting contracts tainted by 
such a purpose; it was either that or go out of that particular business. 
The approach taken by the full Federal Court has been criticised by Burchett J in 
News Limited v Australian Rugby Football League Limited107 the facts of which 
are summarised in footnote I 07 below. Although he found that the structure et 
up by the Australian Rugby Football League was not an exclusionary provision as 
defined in s 40
108 
he did discuss the concept of purpose necessary to breach both 
that section and s 45(2)(a)(ii}'09. 
His Honour referred to the previously quoted passage from ASX Operations Pty 
Ltd v Pont Data Systems Australia Pty Ltd that s 4F directs attention to the 
'subjective' purposes of individuals and said: 
"But to say that the purpose of the provision is to be ascertained 
subjectively is not to remove all difficulty. Under consideration is a 
provision of what is said to be a contract arrangement or understanding 
made or arrived at 'between persons any two or more of whom are 
competitive with each other'. Must the purpose be the purpose of all of 
them? Is it enough that the purpose is the purpose of one or some of 
them, and if so what about ... where the purpose is that of a party to the 
contract ... who is ... not competitive with any of the other parties?"0" 
107 
( 1996) A TPR 41-466. We need not pay a great deal of attention to the facts. The Australian 
Rugby Football League had put in place a number of contracts with Rugby Football Club 
to field teams to play in a league. Each club was both exclusively bound and entitled to 
play in the league for five years, so there were contractual prohibitions against playing 
outside the league. As part of the contractual matrix, each club agreed to sign its players, 
coaches and other staff to contracts approved by the Rugby Football League as being 
consistent with the contracts between the league and individual clubs. 
News Limited signed key players, coaches and staff into a "superleague" which would 
have brought the RFL structure to an end. Simultaneously, it commenced proceedings 
alleging that the agreements between the RFL and clubs and the clubs and their players, 
coaches and staff were in breach of s 45(2}(a)(ii) Trade Practices Act (Cth) 1974 (among 
other alleged breaches). 
108 
This section prohibits provisions between competitors which have "the purpose of 
preventing, restricting or limiting" supply or acquisition of goods. 
109 
pages 41,700-704 
110 page 41,700 
"n~ ~----
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In the face of a submission that the purpose had to be shared by all partie 111 His 
Honour referred to ASX Operations Pty Ltd v Pont Data Systems Australia Pty 
Ltd as authority for the proposition that "the subjective te t could be satisfied by 
the purposes of some only of the parties to the agreement who were, as a matter 
of fact, responsible for it having been included in the agreement 112 and said: 
[This] decision ... was an unusual case where one party's peculiar 
position gave it a special preponderance of power in the negotiation of a 
contract. In general, and of their very nature, contracts arrangements 
and understandings made or arrived at between parties are 
characterized by their mutuality. Most often, it will be very difficult to 
find that a provision was included in fact for a particular purpose, where 
that purpose was confined to a single party. Where there is some kind 
of consensus, it is to be expected that a provision will have been 
included in it for purposes mutually agreed or contemplated. 113 
He goes on to say: 
"[ Section] 4F envisages cases where the proscribed purpose is but one 
of several purposes... But it has to be remembered that s 4o applies to 
contracts generally, and it would be strange if the legislature intended 
that a party's contract, entered into for an entirely innocent and 
appropriate reason, should be vitiated by a purpose confined to the 
other party to the other contract, which, since purpose does not have to 
be disclosed when contracts are concluded, may quite possibly remain 
111 
based upon Carlton and United Breweries (NSW) Ltd v Bond Brewing New South Wales Ltd 
(1987) ATPR 40-820 at 48,880 where Wilcox J said "The purpose referred to in para (b) 
of the definition is a purpose common to the parties" where an arrangement was alleged 
between competitors. Here Tooth had sold its brewery business to Carlton but retained its 
hotel estate, giving an undertaking not to sell for five years and an option to purcha e to 
Tooth. Carlton then sold the headleases of the hotel to a competing brewery, Tooheys, 
which gave Tooheys considerable power to increase sales of its products through the 
hotels, at the expense of Carlton. This proceeding concerned Carlton's application to 
injunct the putting into effect of the agreement, in the context of which the court was 
required to assess the strength of Carl ton's allegation that the agreement amounted to an 
exclusionary provision, in breach of s 4D or was a contract arangement or understanding 
for the purpose of substantially lessening competition, in breach of s 45(2)( a)(ii). Carlton 
failed because it had not established a critical element, namely that Tooth shared 
Toohey's anti-competitive purpose. Importantly, His Honour said " ... to say that the 
purpose of another party is a very different thing from saying that the former shared the 
latter's purpose." (page 48,880) 
112 page 41,701 
113 page 41,701 
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undisclosed... Furthermore, although it is clear that s. 4F applies to the 
construction of s 4o , it should not be overlooked s 4F is a general 
provision and there is some verbal infelicity in its application to s 4o. 
That is because s 4F, requiring a subjective interpretation of purpose, 
has to be applied to s 4o which is expressed in objective terms... I. .. 
conclude that the subjective purpose of one party only can hardly be 
regarded as falling within an intention the legislature has expressed by 
the words 'the provision has the purpose'." 
He then appears to deal with the difficulty between the two sections by saying that 
limiting purpose to only 'substantial purposes' "profoundly affects the operation of 
s 4D
114
". After traversing a number of authorities concerning the meaning of 
'substantial'
115 
he noted, in the context of a hypothetical joint tendering between 
competitors: 116 
"In the case of an ordinary commercial dealing, the purpose would 
simply be the pursuit by the tenderers of their own businesses. In other 
words, s 4o would strike at perfectly proper transactions if the 
legislature's careful insistence on an improper purpose were not 
insufficiently heeded. In the case of this particular section, it is the illicit 
purpose which is essential to an allegation of breach." 
Unfortunately, he does not specifically address the problem which would arise if 
only one of the parties had the illicit purpose and in terms of factual findings, only 
holds that whatever proscribed purpose may have been pre ent, it wa not 
substantial. An interesting feature of that case is that while His Honour could not 
see any 'contract arrangement or understanding' between competitors ... 
Breach of s 45(2)(a)(ii) was al o alleged. Because Hi Honour had held that the 
markets contended for by the plaintiff did not exist, he had no further need to 
consider this allegation so only in very brief terms mentioned that, because of hi 
114 page 4 I ,702 
115 
including Devenish v Jewel Food Stores Pty Ltd (1991) ATPR 41-098, the Dandy Power and 
Radio 2UE cases and Dowling v Dalgety Australia Ltd 
116 page 41 ,704 
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findings in regards to the alleged exclu ive dealing arrangements, there was no 
contract arrangement or understanding nor relevant purpo e. 
With all re pect to His Honour, this treatment of this allegation wa overly 
cursory. In considering whether there was a contract arrangement or 
understanding in breach of s 4F, he was constrained to only con ider the situation 
as between competitors. If the decision in ASXO was to be given full effect, he 
was required to consider the vertical arrangements between the Australian Rugby 
Football League and the member clubs and consider the que tion of purpose 
afresh. 
117 
It is however interesting in itself that he saw no need to conduct such 
an enquiry. 
An interesting feature however of this case is that there wa no suggestion of 
coercion on the part of the Australian Rugby Football League, with the individual 
players and clubs signing up for their own self-interest; they were after all given a 
contractually enforceable exclusive right to participate in the League for five 
years. 
11 7 
These comments are echoed by the editorial comments at page 41 ,648 
40 
IV INTERPRETATION OF PURPOSE UNDER SECTION 27, 
COMMERCE ACT 
By way of reminder, s 27( 1) Commerce Act 1986 reads: 
"No person shall enter into a contract or arrangement, or arrive at an 
understanding, containing a provision that has the purpose, or has or is 
likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition within a 
market." 118 
An interesting comment is made by Utton 119 in relation to Section I, Article 85 
Treaty of Rome which prohibits agreements which have the effect of preventing 
etc competition, is that "since Article 85 is concerned with the effects rather than 
the substance of an agreement, it can be applied both to horizontal and vertical 
restrictions." 
Although New Zealand has had some form of legislation dealing with competition 
since 1910
120
, this was the first time this formulation had been used. The 1986 
Act indicated a clear departure from the Commerce Act 1975 with its style of 
defining numerous "restrictive trade practices" and then providing equally 
numerous "public interest" exceptions. 
11 8 
The wording is reminiscent of Areeda's rejection of a 'purpose or effect' component and 
indicates a clear embracing of these concepts as relevant. It is worth considering why 
Areeda so disfavoured purpose of conduct as having any place in antitrust analysis. In 
para 1506, he explains hi position thus: "Such statements seem to call for inquiry into a 
defendant's state of mind. That inquiry invites the parties to examine thoousands of 
documents, to depose nearly everyone, to resist early disposition on the ground that 
disputed intention requires trial, to burden the judge and jury with ambiguous evidence, 
and to invite decision on the basis of relative purity of heart rather than competitive 
impact... 
[S]earching out intent tends to make antitrust litigation interminable with the massive 
discovery or trial that threatens to overburden the system... Even worse, emphasising 
purpose frequently masks a failure to analyze the conduct. The judge or jury seems 
more comfortable examining the defendant's soul than analyzing his conduct and why 
antitrust policy calls for its prohibition or toleration." (emphasis added) 
119 page 157 
12° Commercial Trusts Act 1910 
41 
There are very clear as ociation betweens 27 and s 45(2)(a)(ii) Trade Practices 
Act (Cth) 1974, which, as has been een, itself had very clear as ociations with the 
1890 United States Sherman Act. 
In Hill and JonesiX, s 27 is de cribed 12 1 a a "general prohibition ... against any bi-
lateral and multi-lateral relationships which m fact ub tantiaJly le sen 
competition, or in fact have that purpose". They then identify a number of 
activities between competitors which will be the subject of scrutiny under the 
section. The focus of their commentary, as in the Australia, i on the proof of 
collusion, rather than giving any credence to the notion that there can be a breach 
of the section without anything in the nature of collusion being present. 
A similar view appears to have been taken by other authors. In Farrar and 
Borrowdalex 122 : 
"Apart from the unilateral behaviour of dominant firms and the coercive 
practices of individual suppliers engaged in resale price maintenance, 
the focus of the Commerce Act is on collusive action arising from an 
agreement." 
In the context of s 27 specifically: m 
"Section 27 ... is the catchall provision; the section applies to all types of 
anti-competitive arrangements whether they be horizontal or 
vertical. .. [T]here must however be duality of action in the form of a 
contract, arrangement or understanding... The key question is whether 
the provision has the purpose or effect of substantially lessening 
competition." 
12 1 page 49 
122 
page 643. It is appreciated that this text ha been superseded by the Third Edition, published 
in 1996 but an attempt is being made here to give an account of the interpretation of 
'purpose' prior to the decision in Commerce Commission v Port Nelson Ltd. 
123 page 673-4 
42 
The problem of whether purpo e is to be seen ubjectively or objectively is then 
considered but the question is not addressed at all of who, among the parties to a 
contract arrangement or under landing, needs to have the purpose. 124 
One of the earliest New Zealand ea es is Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual 
Rental Cars
125 
in which the actions of the airport authority in entering into 
conces ion contracts with only two rental car companies and agreeing to exclude 
all others was challenged as being in breach of both s 29 and 27. Barker J 
found 
126 
that a 'meeting of mind ' was required which necessarily involved 
communication. That however was to decide whether there was any contract 
arrangement or understanding at all between the competitors for s 29. For 27, 
His Honour dealt with purpose very shortly, when he said: 127 
"Purpose ... must be interpreted objectively ... 
Although ARA's stated purpose was to maximise revenue, a 
'substantial' purpose of the collateral contracts was to lessen 
competition. The premium bids and the value attached to airport 
representation by [two incumbent rental companies] demonstrate this. 
This purpose was to deny a potential third entrant the ability to compete 
on equal terms... Indeed, if [witness for Avis] evidence is to be 
accepted ... a purpose from Avis' point of view is not to make large 
profits but to keep the troublesome competitor at a continuing 
disadvantage. 
One very interesting feature of this case is that His Honour does not seem to have 
taken the trouble to find that either of the rental car companie shared ARA' 
purpose; he looked at the terms of the contract, ARA's motive and determined 
there was a provision with the pro cribed purpose 128. 
124 
This is particularly interesting given that reference is made to the ASX Operations case at 
page 679 but no mention is given to any possible significance that ea e might have on the 
definition of purpose. This is remedied in the Third Edition where the issue is 
specifically discussed at pages 651-3 
125 
[1987] 2 NZLR 647 at 661-4 and 677 
126 page 664 
127 page 677 
128 
At page 680, he wrote: "Although ARA's motive may have been to max1m1se rent, by 
accepting only two rental car operators, its means of acheiving this objective wa the u e 
its dominant po ition to exclude competitors of the succes ful concessionaires. The 
43 
Further consideration was provided by McGechan J and RG Blunt in Union 
Shipping NZ Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd129. In that case, a factual finding wa that 
PNL's wider purpose was to ensure maximised resource utilisation but "we do not 
doubt a subsidiary purpose ... has been and is to bar or inhibit USSL from u ing 
its own plant in the area of overlap between USSL and PNL forklifts. 130" 
This was found to be a purpose in contravention of s 36, namely preventing or 
deterring competitive conduct. The court seems to have accepted that PNL had 
the purpose of substantially lessening competition 131 and then con idered whether 
there was a likelihood of a substantial lessening of competition. No attempt 
however was made to translate PNL's purpose into the purpose of the proposed 
provision. In reaching this decision, the following was said 132 : 
"Under the statutory definition in s 2(5) 'purpose' is not confined to 'sole 
purpose' ... Like so many mental concepts, the reference to 'purpose has 
its difficulties... The word used is not merely 'intention'. Intention to do 
an act, which is known to have anti-competitive consequences, in itself 
is not enough. 'Purpose' implies object or aim. The requirement is that 
the 'conduct producing the consequences was motivated or inspired by 
a wish for the occurrence of the consequences' 133 • 
collateral contracts therefore had the purpose of excluding other potential 
concessionaires." 
129 
[ 1990) 2 NZLR 662. This case resulted from an attempt by PNL to make all users enter into 
"port User Licences" specific terms of which would require use of PNL provided plant or, 
when that proposal was not taken up by users, to pay a levy which included a 'handling 
charge' whether PNL plant was used or not. Against the background of an alleged 
dominance on the part of PNL, a hipper and a stevedoring company (both of which 
asserted the right to use their own plant) attacked these praposals a being in breach of s 
27( 1) by having the purpose or effect of substantially lessening competition within 
particular markets in the Port Nelson geographic area. 
130 page 710 
131 
This is not specifically stated but seems implicit in the following: "Did that contemplated 
contract have the purpose ... of substantially lessening competition ... ? The primary 
purpose was to maintain use of PNL plant and drivers at optimum level. The secondary 
purpose, as found, was to prevent or deter USSL from engaging in compeitive conduct in 
a market... That purpose would have been likely o have that very effect on USSL. 
Having accepted that purpose and likely effect in relation to USSL ... would it have been 
likely to substantially lessen competition ... ?" at page 713, lines 45 - 54 
132 at page 707 
133 
citing Donald & Heydon Trade Practices Law 1989 para 5.400. 
44 
It i unfortunate that the court was attempting to di cuss the concept of purpose 
here for the dual context of s 27 and 36 as if there were no differences between 
the two. It proceeded with a discussion of whether the approach to purpose was 
subjective or objective, and in respect of s 36 anyway, left the "question of 
principle open 
134
". The reference in s 36 is to using a dominant position for 
proscribed purposes whereas in s 27 it is the purpo e of a provision which is 
critical, so plainly there is potential for differences between the two. 
An important feature is that whether the purpose was to be ascertained 
subjectively or objectively, there was not even a mention of whether PNL's anti-
competitive purpose would be sufficient in itself to render the provision anti-
competitive, with the focus instead being upon the effect of the provision. 
The concept of purpose also received attention in New Zealand Magic Millions 
Ltd v Wrightson Bloodstock Ltd135• Without considering the matter at length, the 
court found that Wrightson's subjective purpose contravened s 36136 and then had 
to face a curious submission that an injunction favouring Magic Millions would 
breach s 27 because it would sanction an arrangement of the market which the 
parties could not have reached themselves. The court rejected this on the basi 
there would be no lessening of competition but also said 137 
"Section 27 is aimed at contracts or understandings between parties 
having the collusive effect of reducing competition. To bring s 27 into 
play there must I would have thought be some meeting of minds 
between the parties to the alleged contract or arrangement or 
understanding." 
Unfortunately this teasing comment was not taken any further. It is possible to 
read His Honour as saying that, in addition to the contract arrangement or 
134 page 709 at line 39-40 
135 
[1990) I NZLR 731 per Tipping J. For many year Wrightsons had run a thoroughbred 
horse auction. Faced with competition from Magic Millions, it countered by changing 
the dates of its auctions to coincide with those of the new entrant, as a 'spoiler' action. 
Magic Millions alleged breach of both s 36 and of 27. 
136 pages 762 - 4 
137 page 765, lines I - 5 
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understanding, there must al o be some 'meeting of minds' a to anti-competitive 
purpose. 
A Unilateral Purpose 
One decision which deals specifically with this issue i that of Tui Foods Ltd v NZ 
Milk Corp Ltd
138 where, after certain concessions were made, the only issue was 
whether the purpose of a provision requiring exclusive purchases from Tui in 
order to qualify for a rebate was to prevent etc the acquisition of milk from 
anyone but Tui (in particular NZ Milk). In deciding whether purpose was a 
subjectively or objectively determined factor, Cooke J said: 
"I am disposed to think that, if a purpose is discernible on the face of a 
contract or arrangement having regard to the express terms considered 
in the light of any relevant surrounding circumstances, such a purpose 
will qualify under the statute... There may also be cases where, 
although the purpose is not so apparent, it can be shown by evidence 
dehors a contract or arrangement that the intention of the party who 
sought the inclusion of the relevant provision was of a kind falling within 
the prohibition in s 29, and it may be that in such a case what may be 
called a subjective test is sufficient. It is unnecessary, however, for 
present purposes to express a definite view ... 
"It is sufficient in the light of s 2(5)(a) that one of the purposes of the 
inclusion of the provision should be an exclusionary one, provided that it 
is a substantial purpose. It seems inevitably to follow that if the party 
responsible for the presence of the provision in the contract has had 
such a purpose, then the purpose of the other party is not material, for 
the purpose of the first-mentioned party is likely to be a substantial 
purpose and thus to satisfy the definition"' 39 
138 
(1993) 5 TCLR 406; 4 NZBLC 103,335 which involved an arrangement under which milk 
vendors would receive a rebate, so long as they purchased exclusively from Tui 
franchisees. Proceedings were brought by one of Tui's competitors, alleging that this 
amounted to exclusive dealing, in breach of s 29. 
139 Pa 0 e 409-410 e, 
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The e words have been quoted at length because they are the first words which 
unequivocally indicate an acceptance that the purpose of one party, so long as it is 
otherwise in breach of s 29, will not be prevented from constituting a breach just 
because it is not shared by any of the other parties. There i also an important 
reminder that it is the purpose of the provi ion which is critical; if that can be 
ascertained from the provision itself, the purpose of individual parties must be 
irrelevant. 140 
It must be borne in mind with this case that it was an appeal from a decision of 
Heron J refusing an interlocutory injunction, so the court wa only required to 
find an arguable case in favour of this approach 141 rather than resolve the 
argument. Gault J was less enthusia tic than Cooke P, seeing some difficulty in 
applying s 29 in a way which would distinguish between permitted reasonable 
competitive activity and the activities targeted by the section but he was not 
persuaded that Heron J was wrong to find an arguable case 142 • 
Against that background, the court was required to consider the ituation which 
arose in Commerce Commission v Port Nelson ltd1.IJ .. 
140 
This point is expressly made by Heron J in the High Court where he said " .. . the case for an 
objective test ... does not allow for such a [shared purpose] submis ion. If a purpose can 
be derived objectively from the conduct of the parties, it pre upposes that one or other of 
them may not have had the requisite purpose ... " 
141 
Its actual decision, as seen on page 409, was that it was eminently arguable that the case fell 
within s 29( 1 )(b) and that the case was o strong that Cooke P was "certainly not 
prpeared to interfere with the Judge's exercise of his discretion." 
142 page 412 
143 
(1995) 6 TCLR 406 (full text); ( 1995) 5 NZBLC I 03,762 (McGechan J and Professor R G J 
Lattimore, main judgment delivered by McGechan J). PNL (Port Nel on Limited) was the 
owner and operator of wharves, berths, slipways, tug services (including two tug (one medium 
sized and one very large)) and pilotage services (including a pilot launch) at Port Nelson, in 
respect of which it had a 21 year lease of all waterways. 
All ships in excess of 100 gro s registered tonne ("GRT") required the services of a 
pilot, and most ships in excess of 80 metres required the services of one or more tugs to enter the 
port. Both facilities were provided exclusively by PNL from its conception in 1988. It owned 
and crewed two tugs and one pilot launch, although the actual pilotage function was 
subcontracted to Tasman Bay Marine Pilots Limited ("Tasman Bay"). Pilotage was charged to 
hips at a particular rate per GRT with a minimum charge of $173, a system which had been 
inherited from the former Nelson Harbour Board 
At the end of 1990, the pilotage contract came up for renewal. Negotiations broke 
down so the contract was not renewed. PNL then provided a pilot service directly, using 
employed pilots. At the same time, Tasman Bay decided to et up a competing pilotage 
operation and requested PNL's advice as to what conditions would need to be met. An internal 
47 
Essentially the complaint there was that PNL's offering of a below cost pilotage 
charge and a global discount if certain contestable ervices were taken up was in 
breach of s 27. Detailed con ideration wa given as to whether there was a 
purpose of substantially le sening competition behind the offering of these terms 
and then whether such a purpo e on the part of PNL would in it elf be sufficient 
to constitute a breach of s 27. 
His Honour noted the Magic Millions case and decision in Stevedoring Services 
(Nelson) Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd1 44 as authorities requiring " ome meeting of 
minds" between the parties or for contracts, arrangements or understanding to 
PNL report stated that "[i]t is obviously vital at this time that we prevail in this situation ... " and 
it advised Tasman Bay that its tugs and crew would not be available where any vessel wa 
piloted by someone not employed by or contracted to PNL 
Tasman Bay published a scale of charges ($130 to $1,000), arranged insurance cover 
and hired a smallish tug. 
As a result of the decision in Stevedoring Services (Nelson) Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd 
[ I 992] NZAR 5 PNL's charges were under independent review. The draft review sugge ted 
pilotage charges based on full cost recovery and a recommended rate of return of 14%. In light 
of the competition, PNL obtained a revision based on the allocation of only 20% of pilots 
salaries to the pilotage cost centre and a reduced rate of return and profit. The court found that 
the salary allocation was well under what was appropriate, leading to a ubstantial 
understatement of costs. 
Coincidentally (it seems) PNL undercut Tasman Bay with a scale of $100 to $800. The 
final review report commented that the ROR used by PNL was well below average and produced 
recommended pilotage charges somewhat higher than the scale adopted by PNL. 
Shortly afterwards, PNL implemented a discount regime. It was working on a sy tern 
of flexible manning and contended that if ships took a package of services, this would mean 
reduced costs to PNL allowing it to pass that on in the form of a discount. It thus allowed a 5% 
discount if a package of services were taken (pilot or tug or ships lines plus port access, 
berthage, utilities, equipment, lines, wharfage and storage (the latter seven not being 
contestable). Thus by taking on one of PNL's contestable services, a ship would gain acce to a 
discount across a number of incontestable services. The converse was that those who u ed 
competitors for one of the contestable services would be forgoing the possibly ubstantial 
discount on PNL service , although for smaller hips using Ta man Bay's cheaper tug, the 
discount would not always equate to the cost saving in using the smaller tug. 
At the same time, contrary to the accounting review recommendation, it revised its tug 
prices downwards to a "break-even" point, purportedly to align its charges with those in other 
ports. There would thus be an element of cross-subsidisation by other PNL activities. It also 
published a revised scale of pilot charges, to cover the size of ships which Tasman Bay was 
capable of piloting, given the constraint it was under with its small tug. The charges were still 
notably lower than Tasman Bay's. 
Tasman Bay was not scared off by PNL's determination to "prevail" and continued in 
business, establishing a niche at the lower end of the market. In the four years running up to the 
hearing Tasman Bay had piloted 45% of all ship requiring pilots , but because of its access to 
only a small tug, this wa 15% of tonnage or 20% of pilot revenue in Port Nelson. In tugs, 
Tasman Bay had handled 31 % of ships or I 0% of tonnage. 
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[ 1992] NZAR 5 (per McGechan J) 
48 
have "some collusive effect" 
145 of reducing competition. He quoted the following 
from his own decision in the latter case: 
"PNL offers ... that it will contract on terms under which customers 
receive a discount if a full line of services is taken .. .. The contract so 
eventuating, in its resulting provision for such discount, is said to have 
the purpose effect or likely effect of substantially lessening 
competition... The offering of such contracts is said in itself to 
constitute attempts or inducements to enter into the proscribed. 146" 
The particular relevance of this description of the factual situation m the 
Stevedoring Services case is that it is uncannily similar to what Port Ne! on was 
doing following the competition from Tasman Bay, in offering the discount. In 
the earlier case, McGechan J observed: 
"I have considerable doubts whether provisions in those contracts for 
such discounts can be said to have such purpose. A contract is a two 
way affair. Sometimes the purpose of a provision is clear. A contract 
between two wholesalers not to supply a particular retailer unless he 
meets certain terms carries its own united message. However, 
provision for a discount between supplier and customer may arise from 
quite divergent purposes. The supplier offering the discount may seek 
to capture the market. The purchaser taking the discount may seek 
simply to save money. That purchaser may not seek to lessen 
competition at all. To the contrary, he may be all in favour of its 
continuance, with further healthy discounts. It can hardly be said in 
such circumstances that the dominant purpose was to substantially 
lessen competition. Moreover, if a severable purpose of PNL is 
relevant, while such purpose may be to improve its own competitive 
position by increasing its market share upward to perhaps equality, I do 
not regard that purpose as one to lessen competition as a whole. At 
equality, competition would remain vigorous" 
145 
without any apparent recognition that these could be very different concepts. 
146 page 20 
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On the e authorities, there would only be a breach if an anti-competitive purpose 
could be ascertained on the part of at least two parties; the purpose of one party 
in itself would not suffice. In other words, the partie need to go beyond 
embracing the contract arrangement or under tanding but must also be in 
agreement as to its purpose. 
In the later case, His Honour noted 147 that these decision rested on an 
"assumption" that the purpose must be common to both, imply because there are 
two parties to a contract, who must have reached a meeting of minds for the 
formation of the contract. In other words, as a result of finding that an 
arrangement or understanding mu t result from a meeting of minds, he is aying 
the courts have simply assumed that the meeting of minds must also extend to 
being as to anti-competitive purpo e before there will be a breach, without 
exposing that to any critical examination. 
Certainly, there is some validity in what he says. In the majority of cases already 
considered, the courts have been faced with a number of er twhile competitor , 
acting similarly and, in those ea e where purpose rather than effect ha been 
important, having similar anti-competitive purposes. In these cases, the enquiry 
has predominantly been whether the similar conduct can be regarded as the result 
of some contract arrangement or understanding; has a meeting of minds produced 
the conduct? 
On the other hand, an alternative view is that the rea on the courts have not 
considered the necessity for a hared purpose is that the wording of the legislation 
and the weight of authority o obviously calls out for it that it goes without 
saying. We only have to consider the United State origins to ee where s 27 is 
rooted. Perhaps the reason that the is ue of whether the section requires hared 
purpose has not received much judicial attention because would-be plaintiffs, 
faced with the unilateral conduct of a firm, have not seen s 27 (or it overseas 
counterparts) as appropriate. Until recently, s 36 would provide a remedy. 
147 Page 422 
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One major point of di tinction between the two Port Nelson cases is that in the 
Stevedoring Services case, it had no dominance in the relevant market 148, indeed 
was the minor player whereas it was obviously dominant in the later case. 
In any event, His Honour saw the Court of Appeal decision in Tu.i Foods as a 
clear statement that the purpose of the party re pon ible for the inclusion of a 
provision in a contract would uffice, which directly contradicted his own 
previously stated views. His Honour viewed the difference in approach as being a 
function of the different assumption made. The Court of Appeal in Tui Milk had 
started from the premise that s 2(5)(a) contemplated a multiplicity of purpo e , 
with the need being only to find a substantial anti-competitive purpose among 
them. 
With respect, both McGechan J and the Court of Appeal appear to have mis-
conceived the application of s 2(5)(a). It is a basic fact of human nature that we 
never act for solely one purpo e; no matter what we are doing, we will be 
motivated by a number of desires, intentions and purpo e , sometimes in conflict 
with each other. For an incorporated body, the task of discovering the purpose of 
its conduct is more difficult, because it is arguably the aggregate of all the 
purposes of those who control it. The law has long recogni ed and provided for 
this, by allowing a dominant or substantial, as opposed to sole, purpose to be 
sufficient. 
Whiles 27 is expressed in terms of the purpose of the provision (which tends not 
to allow for examination of the (mixed) purposes of the parties), s 2(5)(a) allow 
an enquiry into why such a provi ion wa included, and so does appear to invite 
examination of the parties' purposes. Because identifying one single purpo e will 
be impossible, a 'substantial' anti-competitive purpo e will suffice. 
148 
which, at page 422 of CC v Port Nelson Ltd seems to be taken to negate any anti-competitive 
purpo e on the part of Port Nelson. 
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The difficulty is is that this section is een as authorising the abandonment of any 
need for shared purpose, which is extremely unlikely to have been in the minds of 
the legi lators when enacting it. No authority is given in Tui Foods for its 
interpretation and it is important to remember its context; an appeal on an 
interlocutory injunction application. 
While he considered that the conclusion that a unilateral purpose would 
inevitably suffice was an overstatement, McGechan J considered himself bound 
by Tui Milk, despite that case being an interlocutory application 149 on a different 
section, saying: 
"If, as the Court of Appeal has ruled, unilateral purpose will suffice for s 
29, it would be anomalous to apply a different test to s 27." 
This is ignoring the warning from the Australian cases to recognise that 'purpose' 
will differ from context to context, depending upon the precise wording of the 
particular section. Section 29 is concerned with exclusionary provision m 
contracts between competitor which have the purpose of limiting the supply of 
goods to or acquisition from some other person(s). His Honour aid that in that 
context: 
"It is more than likely one party (supplier) will wish to restrict the other 
(acquirer); while that latter would prefer to retain freedom. Unilateral 
anticompetitive purpose will be a norm.... The same need not 
necessarily be true of s 27 ... 
However, even with all such allowances, I do not see a sensible 
distinction... In both cases, the question is whether 'purpose' must be 
common, or can merely be unilateral. in both cases, s 2(5)(a) 
recognition of multiple purposes, including one (substantial) 
149 
He describes the Court of Appeal as "the reasoned approach of a superior court, to be 
followed if there is some sensible di tinction and good reason" at page 423. 
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anticompetitive purpose, applies... The difference, however, is one less 
of kind than of degree." 
Again, with re pect, objection must be taken to that statement. There are sensible 
distinctions to be drawn between Tui Foods and Port Nelson. In the former, the 
milk vendor accepted contractual terms preventing them from dealing with any 
competitor of Tui; they therefore had knowledge of Tui's anti-competitive 
purpose, which was 'writ large' upon the face of the contract and chose to conduct 
themselves upon those terms. 
In Port Nelson however, while there were financial advantages for dealing with 
PNL, the shippers were free to deal with such competitors as existed. Using the 
American terminology, the Port Nelson appeal was to the individual self intere t 
of potential customers, whereas Tui Foods went further, by including contractual 
prohibitions. 
His Honour drew further support for this view from the Australian deci ion of 
ASX Operations
150
, the decision in which was delivered after argument was 
concluded, so only limited reference was made. 
Hampton sees this result as a consequence of the court eparating out the various 
component of s 27 which in his view was "bound to re ult... in a mechanical 
literal interpretation of the section ... 
151
" The proper approach was to see the very 
150 
ASX Operations Pty Ltd v Pont Data Australia Pty Ltd (1990) 27 FCR 460; 97 ALR 513; 19 
IPR 323; (1991) 13 ATPR 41-069 (full Federal Court) where it was slated that s 45, 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (the Australian equivalent of s 27( 1 )) "operates upon contracts 
which will be between two or more parties, some of whom may not have the proscribed 
purpose ... [I]t is therefore appropriate to look to the purpose of the party as a result of 
whose efforts they [the provisions alleged to be anti-competitive] were included"). Note 
that this case is somewhat different, in that one party to a contract was complaining that 
the other was acting in breach, by forcing particular provisions upon it. 
151 page 6 
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words "contract arrangement or understanding" a necessarily importing the 
notion of concerted action. In other words, not only mu t the parties be party to 
some contract, they must also in some way be embracing the anti-competitive 
nature of that contract. 
Quite plainly, the Court did not do that. It found a contract, it found a pro cribed 
purpose and found that that purpose was a 'substantial purpose' of a provision of 
the contract without giving any consideration as to the character of the contract, 
which was simply for the supply of goods and services at pecified price . There 
was no specific agreement or 'meeting of minds' between the parties as to the 
possibility of any anti-competitiveness but that wa irrelevant to the point that no 
consideration was given to PNL's customers purposes at all. 
It is difficult to see where, as a matter of logic, this proce s will end. Is every 
contract entered into by a party with a purpose, no matter how unrealistic or 
futile, of substantially lessening competition going to lead to a breach of s 27? 
As Arnold 
152 
notes, whether this is an acceptable approach depends upon the 
policy objective one ascribes to the section. Taking s 27 in isolation, the 
insistence upon a common purpose could be said to undermine the utility of the 
Act so the adoption of a unilateral purpose approach is arguably more consistent 
with an overall objective of maintaining competition. 
The point is that this is unrealistic; there is no need to take it in i olation and 
indeed it is contrary to the apparent policy objectives behind s 36 to do so. That 
section, along with other provisions such as the Resale Price Maintenance 
152 "Competition Law" (1995] NZ Law Rev 370, at 382 
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prohibitions, can be seen a a clear statement of the limits upon conduct of single 
firm in New Zealand markets. If a single firm, not acting in conjunction with any 
other, i not in breach of s 36, it could be argued that the Parliamentary intention 
was that uch conduct be permi able. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal saw fit almost immediately to " ... ay at the out et 
we have not been satisfied the court below proceeded on any wrong basi or made 
material findings that were not reasonably open" 153• 
It simply aid that it would con iderably limit the effectivenes of the provi ion if 
the purpose had to be common to or shared by all. It said further that thi 
approach was inconsistent with s 2(5)( a) which allow the purpose to be one of a 
number of purposes. After referring to Tui Foods lirnited v New Zealand Milk 
Corporation
154 
and ASX Operations Pty Ltd v Pont Data Australia Ltd155 the 
court noted that parties may contravene the section in ignorance and said: 
"But that may occur also where a proscribed effect or likely effect is 
involved. The objective of the statutory provision must be borne in 
mind. The promotion of competition should not be inhibited by the 
artificiality of search for unanimous purposes." 
One major difficulty is with the Court of Appeal's blunt di mi al of News Limited 
v Australian Football League Ltd156 as being irrelevant. A has been een, 
Burchett J made cogent criticisms of the approach in ASX Operations v Pont 
Data and stated his views were equally applicable to the argument under s 
45(2)( a)( ii/57. 
153 page 2 
154 
( 1993) 5 TCLR 406 
155 (1990) 97 ALR 513 
156 (1996) 135 ALR 33,99 
157 
Although this author has challenged that, at the very least we hould have seen some 
di cu ion by the Court of Appeal. 
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Interestingly, after stating that it wa immaterial that the Tui Foods case was 
founded on s 29 to the validity of the Port Nelson deci ion, the court then 
dismissed the News Limited ea e on the ground it was based on s 4D Trade 
Practices Act (Cth) 1974, similar to ours 29. No explanation is given as to why 
some interpretations of s 29 are u eful in interpreting s 27 and not others. 
If we then consider what the Court of Appeal has to say on the issue of predatory 
pricing
158
, it becomes clear that that court will regard any offer or sale of goods at 
below cost to be in breach of s 27, so long as the "sub tantial lessening of 
competition" requirement is met. As there is no logical rea on to confine thi 
approach to pricing below cost, the Court of Appeal appear to be saying that any 
conduct which has the purpose or effect of substantially lessening competition 
will breach s 27 irrespective of whether a perpetrator acts in concert or alone or 
whether it is dominant or not. 
While there might be merit in New Zealand adopting a conduct based test , this 
should perhaps be way of legislative change rather than a significant judicial 
rewriting of the statute. This i particularly so in light of the Australian statute 
which expressly refers to the purpose of conduct in sections uch as s 47( 10). 
The New Zealand Legislature clearly had the Australian Trade Practices Act in 
mind when enacting the Commerce Act 1986 and by not adopting a conduct based 
test can be seen to be disavowing such an approach. 
B Subjective or Objective Ascertainment of Purpose? 
Allied to whether purpose had to be hared i the issue of whether purpose i to 
be subjectively or objectively ascertained. It i not proposed to deal with this at 
158 (pages 29-30) 
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length. In Port Nelson McGechan J noted that the is. ue was one of "rampant 
uncertainty" 159. 
He saw it as "standing out" that an objective approach will qualify and that where 
the objective evidence is lacking, subjective evidence would uffice. The Court of 
Appeal in Tui Foods had not however addressed the i sue of which would prevail 
where there was a conflict between the two tests. 
He went on to consider
160 Australian decisions, where a large number favoured 
the adoption of the subjective approach 161 However the later decision in General 
Newspapers Pty Ltd v Telstra Cor/62 "diluted" 163 the strength of these deci ion .. 
McGechan J found
164 
"The relevance of the subjective eems to be all one way." 
A strict application of General Newspapers would mean the Commerce 
Commission could use evidence of a defendant's intent to supplement its case but 
the defendant could not rely on this type of evidence to rebut inferences of a 
breach. His Honour held that the plaintiff could adduce evidence to establi h a 
breach either objectively or ubjectively but, if any subjective evidence was given, 
as a matter of justice, the defendant should be able to rebut it. 
Having said that, the very use of the word purpose (and the deeming effect of s 
2( 5)( a)) as opposed to effect in s 27 mu t invite consideration of what a defendant 
intended when imposing a provision alleged to be in breach of the Act. 
159 
The objective approach was taken in ARA v Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland Airport) Ltd 
[ 1987) 2 NZLR 647 while the subjective approach had been taken in NZ Magic Millions 
Ltd v Wrightson Bloodstock Ltd (supra) but the question had been left open in Union 
Shipping NZ Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd (supra). In Tui Foods Ltd v NZ Milk Corp Ltd (supra), 
the Court of Appeal had expressed the view that either an objective test or in some 
circumstances a subjective test would suffice. 
160 
after noting the lack of concrete views expressed in Telecom Corp of NZ Ltd v Clear 
Communications Ltd (1995) I NZLR 385; (1994) 6 TCLR 138; 5 NZBLC 103,552. 
Telecom had tried to show their proposed interconnection pricing regime did not have an 
anti-competitive purpose to negate the inference from their conduct that they did . Their 
Lordships said (Page 403, 154, p I 03,556): 
"This was a hopeless task not only because it would be most improbable that Telecom lacked the 
purpose to deter its bitter rival, Clear, but also because its past conduct and certain of its 
internal memoranda show that it did in fact have that purpose." 
161 
Summarised in, and including, ASX Operations Pty Ltd v Pom Data Australia Pty Ltd 
(supra) 
162 
(1993) 45 FCR 164; 117 ALR 629; 15 ATPR 41-274 
163 Page 427 
164 Page 429 
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One of the difficultie in dealing with the concept of purpose and whether it is to 
be subjective or objective i that there appears to be a merging together of two 
entirely separate concepts. As was discussed in the Dandy Power case, the 
differing words of the statute will determine whether it is the ubjective purposes 
of the parties which are critical to con titute the breach or whether it is the more 
objective purpose of particular conduct or a provision of a contract. That is a 
completely different enquiry from whether the purpose is to be determined 
subjectively or objectively. 
The Court of Appeal simply stated that the argument over whether purpose wa 
to be measured subjectively or objectively is 
" ... unimportant in practice. There will be very little difference in most 
cases between ascertaining subjective purpose by inference from what 
was said and done and ascribing objectively a purpose from evidence of 
what was said and done." 
What they have not dealt with is the issue of whether the enquiry i into the actual 
purpose of the party (which seems to be called for by s 36 even if that i to be 
objectively determined) or the more objective purpo e of a provision itself, which 
might in some cases be entirely independent of the parties to it. With re pect, 
Barker J in his very brief statement of the position in ARA Mutual Cars seems to 
have been closest to what s 27 actually require without getting engaged by the 
morass presented by the subjective/objective debate. 
C Dominance and Section 36 
At first blu h, the concept of a non-dominant firm unilaterally exerting influence 
to lessen competition is oxymoronic; if a firm i in such a position, it might be 
thought that the firm would be within the definition of dominance and the exertion 
of this influence would constitute a breach of s 36. In the introduction, the 
question was posed as to why, as PNL was so clearly dominant, it conduct wa 
not in breach of s 36. 
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The issue as to what constitutes dominance did not ari e bccau e whatever test of 
dominance 165, it was met on the fact . The real difficulty with the application of s 
36 was the Privy Council te t of "use" in Telecom Corporation of NZ Ltd v Clear 
Communications Ltd166: 
"[l]t cannot be said that a person in a dominant market position "uses" 
that position for the purposes of s 36 unless he acts in a way which a 
person not in a dominant position but otherwise in the same 
circumstances would have acted. 
The Court of Appeal expressed doubt with this, by saying 
"[w]hile it is not easy to see why use of a dominant position should not 
be determined simply as a question of fact without the need to postulate 
artificial scenarios" 167 
but was content "in this case" to adopt the approach. In the High Court, 
McGechan J had seen no 'use' in this sense when PNL set it prices and offered 
the discount. The Commerce Commission appealed but the Court of Appeal saw 
no practical reason to consider that cross appeal. It did however say that: 
"Nevertheless it should be acknowledged that there is strength in the 
argument that a firm not in a dominant position in port facilities, tugs 
and pilotage would run considerable risk in structuring a discount so that 
it was not available until every required service was taken. Once one 
165 
In the ARA v Mutual Rental Cars and the NZ Magic Millions ea es, the court adopted the 
'economic power' test from Re Continental Can Co Inc [1972] CMLR DI I but in 
Telecom Corporation of NZ Ltd v Commerce Commission [ 1992] 3 NZLR 429 at page 
434, Cooke P reinforced the need to rely upon the words of the tatute itself and adopted 
a more stringent 'dictionary' test, saying that to be dominant, a firm needed "a prevailing, 
commanding, ascendant, governing, primary, principal or leading influence' within a 
market. This case was confirmed as the "applicable authority" to determine the meaning 
of dominance by the Court of Appeal in Porl Nelson Ltd v Commerce Commission. That 
obviously has the effect of limiting the numbers of firms which can be dominant, which 
is perhaps appropriate in New Zealand, given its relatively small economy and 
conseqentially concentrated markets. 
166 
[ 1995] 1 NZLR 385 at page 403 
167 page 42 
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service is declined there is no incentive to take any. Similarly, where a 
pilotage market is contestable the risk of charging below cost in the 
smaller vessel sector without the assurance of the ability to recover in 
the larger vessel sector would be real enough." 168 
In effect, the Court of Appeal eems to be indicating that there was ufficient 
evidence for it to find use of the dominant position but de-emphasi ed that in 
favour of an authoritative statement as to the possible application of s 27. 
The cumulative effect of the Court of Appeal deci ion in Telecom v Commerce 
Commission and the Privy Council in Telecom v Clear is to everely proscribe the 
possible application of s 36, limiting its applicability to those ituations where 
firms have a 'commanding' influence and only engage in conduct that a firm not in 
that position would not be engaged in . The reason for this limitation is not clear, 
particularly as the courts are quite plainly prepared to see the conduct of such 
firms as in breach of s 27. 
D Merits of This Approach 
1 Purposive Approach 
The Court of Appeal has asserted that it would be incon istent with the purpose 
of the legislation to require a shared proscribed purpose among all parties to a 
contract arrangement or understanding. One could snipe and ay that has not 
deterred them in the interpretation of "use" for s 36. In thi context, it is worth 
noting what has been said to be the purpose or objective of the Cornmerce Act: 
" 'It is based on the premise that society's resources are best allocated 
in a competitive market where rivalry between firms ensures maximum 
efficiency in the use of resources.' It is the [promotion of competition 
which the Court is directed to foster." 169 
168 page 44 
169 
U11io11 Shipping NZ Ltd v Port Nelso11 Ltd [ 1990] 2 NZLR 662 at 699-700 quoting in part 
from the judgmenl in Tru Tone Ltd & Ors v Festival Records Retail Marketi11g Ltd 
[ 1988) 2 NZLR 352 al 358. 
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If we consider s 36 along ide its Australian counterpart 170, it becomes apparent 
that the New Zealand legislature was prepared to tolerate a higher degree of 
market power within individual firms before they would meet the threshold of 
applicability, presumably because of the smaller economy and consequent 
concentration of markets. Sub tantial market power is necessarily to be tolerated 
if we are to have any firm acting at or near economies of scale. This approach 
allows firms to gain significant market power, at the expense of competition to at 
least some extent, before they will be within the threshold test of s 36. 
The current interpretation of sec 27 is that firms which have not reached this 
threshold but nonetheless have ome ability to influence a market and competition 
within it by unilateral action will be caught. This appears to be contrary to the 
plain meaning of s 36 which favours tolerance. It must be remembered that in 
Port Nelson, the reason the conduct there was not in breach of s 36 had nothing 
to do with a lack of dominance; rather it was the high level at which the Privy 
Council has set the meaning of 'use'. 
Of course, if a firm acts unilaterally with the purpose of les ening competition, but 
has no appreciable market power one can expect it to have no effect. On the 
authority of Port Nelson Ltd v Commerce Commission that firm, despite the 
complete futility of its action will be in breach of s 27. How is that consistent 
with the objectives of the Commerce Act 1986? 
170 
Section 46, Trade Practices Act 1974 is expressed in term of corporations having a 
substantial degree of market power, not dominance. 
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2 Tool For Dealing With Oligopolies? 
In appendix two is a di cussion of the problems presented by oligopolies. 
Hovenkamp argues that in non-co-operative oligopolie , there is a problem of 
learned behaviour whereby firm , by trial and error in effect, learn they can restrict 
output or increase prices above the competitive equilibrium with impunity so there 
is real harm to the market. 
He ays that United States antitrust law is powerless to deal with this situation 
because of its insistence on the formulism of a contract combination or 
conspiracy. It is evident that New Zealand courts are not following thi 
formulistic approach; there is an enquiry as to whether there is any anti-
competitive purpose and then whether any contract have been entered into 
pursuant to that purpose. 
It is purely speculative, but po sible to argue that an oligopolist has an anti-
competitive purpose when it relies on a lack of competition from fellow 
oligopolists to raise prices. Following the Port Nelson decision, whenever the 
oligopolist has that purpose as a substantial purpose, perhaps by selling petrol at a 
premium over what could be obtained in a properly functioning market, there i 
the possibility of breach of s 27. 
V CONCLUSIONS 
In the United States, it is apparent that s I of the Sherman Act still require ome 
form of collusive conduct, in the sense that two or more partie must be fixed 
with some degree of active participation in an anti-competitive cheme before a 
'contract combination or con piracy' will be found. The Courts have shown a 
willingnes to treat as sufficient unwilling participation, through co-ercion, and 
situation where firms simply co-operate knowingly with a party which is acting 
anti-competitively. 
competitiveness. 
There remains however a earch for shared anti-
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It could be argued that ASX Operations v Pont Data notwithstanding, a similar 
approach is taken in Australia even though there are differences in the legislation. 
Pont Data would plainly come within the United States tests for coercion and 
therefor there are no inconsi tencies apparent between the two countries. 
In New Zealand however, the point has been reached that when cu tomer act 
purely out of elf interest with no reason to even suspect anti-competitive purpose 
on the part of their supplier, there can be breach of s 27. The search for some 
form of 'arrangement or understanding' appears to have been made redundant and, 
through a process of elision, that part of s 27 which ays "enter into a contract or 
arrangement, or arrive at an understanding containing a provi ion" eems to have 
lost any purpose or effect. Instead, the courts have regarded the unilateral actions 
of one firm as equating to the elided words. 
The 'legislative purpose' arguments in favour of such an approach have been given 
only in very summary form by the Courts, without appreciation of the heritage of 
the Act nor that there is an undermining of other element within it, particularly s 
36. Finally, in the light of the Court of Appeal decision in Port Nelson Limited v 
Commerce Commission, New Zealand has been thrown into a position of being 
unable to determine the extent to which contracts may offend against s 27. 
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APPENDIX O NE 
Su I and Demand of Petrol 
Price 
Quantity 
If we dip into elementary economics for a moment, we can see a 
demonstration of the harm that might be done by rising the price above 
what Smith called the "natural price" which we will take as being the 
equilibrium price set by the intersection of demand and supply in a 
properly functioning competitive market171 
Consider the above diagram illustrating supply and demand curves for 
petrol. 
171 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse what is meant by a properly functioning market 
or the concept of an equilibrium price. For an explanation of the basic economic theory 
underpinning these terms, reference may be made to a number of introductory economics 
texts, such as Stiglitz or Baumol & Blinder. In addition, mo t antitrust texts contain 
some discussion of antitrust economics, such as Areeda, Corones, or Hovenkamp. 
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In a properly functioning competitive market, petrol will be supplied at 
QE (the equilibrium quantity) and sold at PE (equilibrium price) because 
at that particular price, the quantity demanded by consumers would 
match the quantity suppliers are willing to supply. 
If the supplier had the ability to dictate that supplies be restricted to QM 
and price be increased to P w this would have consequences which are 
generally regarded as inefficient in an economic sense, on both suppliers 
and consumers. If we compare that with PE, many consumers are 
excluded from purchasing petrol (allocative inefficiency). At the same 
time, at that price, firms would actually be willing to supply out beyond 
QE but are not able to do so because of the behaviour of the firms which 
are dictating market terms. Indeed, as many would-be consumers are 
priced out of the market, there is a reduced need for production and 
some firms exit it (productive inefficiency) when compared with the 
equilibrium situation in a competitive market. What this represents is a 
"dead-weight loss" as there is a loss of both consumption and production 
when compared with the theoretical competitive market. 
There is a further effect on consumers which some argue to be harmful, 
in that it transfers wealth away from consumers to suppliers. If we look 
again at the graph, in a competitive market, petrol would be supplied at 
PE. There is still some demand however for petrol at prices above PE, 
which means that there are consumers who would pay more than PE to 
purchase petrol. The fact that the market allows them to buy at less than 
they would be willing to pay provides a form of cost saving or wealth to 
those consumers. If the price is raised to PM however, less consumers 
make this saving, which can be seen as a form of transfer of wealth to the 
supplier away from the consumer. 
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APPENDIX Two 
Hovenkamp discusses the po ition of cartels and oligopolies at length. In respect 
of cartels, he notes: 
"Cartels are inherently more volatile than single firm monopolists. First, 
they can come into existence far more easily ... But even absent legal 
restraint, the cartel is inherently more fragile than the monopolist 
[because] the interests of the cartel as a whole often diverge 
substantially from the interests of individual members. The nature of a 
cartel invites cheating by members. 172" 
After referring to the need to prove some form of "agreement" among two or 
more firms to fix prices or reduce output to breach s 1, Sherman Act he identifies 
a problem with oligopolistic behaviour, as follows: 
"Some conduct falls through a fairly wide crack in the Sherman Act. 
Although anticompetitive, there is no evidence that it resulted from 
explicit agreement among competitors. Nor is it the unilateral conduct 
of a firm that has or threatens to have monopoly power. (which would 
be caught by s 2). Since early in the nineteenth century, economists 
have argued that firms in concentrated markets can increase their 
prices above the competitive level without expressly communicating 
with one another, and certainly without the need for anything resembling 
a "conspiracy" or agreement among the parties. 113" 
He sugge ts that oligopolistic behaviour might be ju t an example of the type of 
conduct which falls through this crack and argues that, despite the 'Ocial co ts of 
oligopoly, s I does not apply. "In those areas where co-operative interaction 
among firms is likely to do the most damage, no "agreement" is required." 
172 page 140- 1 
173 page 151 
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He give a detailed consideration of Cournot equilibrium 174 and concluded that 
Finns within an oligopoly will charge their own profit maximising price with no 
real constraint, as each oligopoli twill do same: 
"One reason antitrust law has had so little success with oligopoly is its 
continued adherence to a common law concept of "agreement" that 
makes little sense in the context of strategic behaviour among 
competing firms. This agreement requirement frequently targets the 
wrong set of practices. Non-co-operative oligopoly situations are often 
more stable, and thus more easily sustained, than co-operative ones. 
For example, in the Cournot oligopoly described [earlier] each firm 
charges its own profit-maximising price, determined by equating its own 
marginal cost and marginal revenue on the assumption that other firms 
will hold their output constant. Adhering to the oligopoly price is profit-
maximising behaviour, given the status quo. As a result, nothing 
resembling a common law contract or conspiracy will be found in the 
orthodox non-co-operative oligopoly." 
The effect of this argument (supported by the Cournot equilibrium model) is that 
finns operating within an oligopoly (such as banks and petrol companie in the 
New Zealand context) will 'learn' that they can raise prices quite uccessfully 
because other members of the oligopoly, pursuing their own self interest will wish 
to do the same. There i no 'agreement' as such, ju t learned behaviour that as 
one adjusts prices, there i no attempt by others to undercut; in tead there is a 
flow-on adjustment, with the result that the price level i above the competitive 
equilibrium price. 
"Under SA analysis, the collusion question has generally reduced to 
consideration of whether there is sufficient agreement-like behaviour 
that one can say a "contract", "combination" or "conspiracy" existed 
among the parties. Historically, this kind of question caused a great 
deal of difficulty in the common law of contracts. By its language, 
Sherman s 1 invited the same problems into antitrust analysis of 
concerted behaviour. Many Sherman Act s 1 decisions hold that the 
174 pages I 51-9 
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statute requires an explicit agreement, although evidence of the 
agreement may sometimes be circumstantial (parallel behaviour, benefit 
in higher prices for both). Much s 1 case law is preoccupied, not with 
the defendant's conduct as such, but with whether that conduct was 
undertaken pursuant to such an agreement. This unfortunate bit of 
formulism has been the major impediment to effective antitrust action 
against poor economic performance in oligopoly markets. In such 
cases the market structure itself produces a "consensus" about how 
each firm can maximise its own profits by tacitly participating in a 
strategy to maximise the joint profits of the group." 
Hovenkamp 175 quotes the views of Professor Turner176
 who argued that it i 
rational and almost inevitable for such conduct to be beyond the reach of the 
Sherman Act, given the market structure: 
"Each firm in an oligopoly market is forced by circumstances to consider 
its own profit-maximising rate of output, given the output of rivals and 
their anticipated responses to its own price and output decisions. To 
ignore these issues would be completely irrational. Furthermore no 
court could draft a decree that would force firms to 'ignore' each other in 
their market decision-making." 
As Hovenkamp notes, in a truly non-co-operative oligopoly, ignoring each other 
is precisely what firms do: 
"Indeed, under the Cournot assumption, each firm totally ignored the 
possible strategic choices that other firms could makem ... 
Profe or (now Judge) Posner responded with a competing view
178 by 
empha i ing similarities between cartels and oligopolie : 
175 page 159 
176 Turner The Definition of Agreement Under th e SA: Com cious Parallelism and Refusals To 
Deal 75 Harv LRev 655 ( 1962) 
177 page 160 
178 Posner Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 2 1 Stan L Rev 1562 ( 1969) 
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"Whether firms in a concentrated market act in response to an express 
agreement or simply have read the market's clear signals in the same 
way should be a mere detail. Under this approach to oligopoly analysis, 
explicit cartel agreements are referred to as 'express collusion' while 
oligopolistic, interdependent behaviour is called 'tacit collusion'. 
Hovenkamp then says: 
"In short, often highly concentrated markets will not produce the classic 
Cournot equilibrium at all, but may actually yield competitive pricing. In 
that case, the firms may have to reach collateral agreements or 
understandings if they are to maintain prices at supracompetitive levels. 
For example, they may agree with each other that they will post sale 
prices publicly or at regular inteNals, or that all transaction terms will be 
publicly announced ... Some highly concentrated markets may in fact 
perform very competitively, unless the participants go the extra step of 
restructuring transactions or changing the way pricing information is 
disseminated. If they engage in these 'facilitating practices', the 
antitrust enforcer may be able to go after the practices directly." 
He then discusses cheating and learning: 
"The result is that the cheater quickly faces a competitive market that 
makes the cheating unprofitable. There will be a few price 'wars' until 
firms discover that any substantial amount of cheating is unprofitable. 
Soon firms will learn that any cut raises a substantial threat of collapse 
of the oligopoly, followed by an indefinite period of competitive prices. 
So the dominant strategy of each firm is not to cheat. Thus ... oligopoly 
outcomes might be quite robust. Importantly, nothing about these 
stories requires an 'agreement' as the antitrust laws use that term." 
d b · 179 and conclu es y saying : 
"All of this leaves us where we started, with a Sherman Act that is 
ineffective to remedy many situations that we think are anti-competitive. 
179 page 162 
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This makes merger policy all the more important as a device for limiting 
the damage." 
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